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Abstract
An economic system called corporatism arose in the late 19th century, promoted by Anti-
Cartesian French intellectuals dismayed with the “disenchantment of the world” Weber attributed
to capitalism, and by a Roman Catholic church equally dismayed with both liberalism and
socialism. Corporatism recognizes the innate inequality of human beings and their need for secure
places in a legitimate hierarchy and thus puts the police power of the state behind officially
sanctioned Corporations, elite-controlled industrial group cartels empowered to set wages, prices,
employment, and quotas, to regulate entry, and to limit imports. Corporatism was to end the class
struggle by guaranteeing workers their accustomed jobs and incomes and by delegating traditional
authority through a principle of subsidiarity. We argue that countries that adopted corporatism
most fully — those with Roman Catholic majorities or French-educated elites — experienced
substantial financial development reversals and retain legacy Corporatist institutions that continue
to retard financial development and growth.
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1.  Introduction 
As the 19th century drew to a close, his Holiness Pope Leo XII grieved at the twin 
evils of liberalism and socialism, which he foresaw imperiling the peace of the 
coming century.1 His solution was the 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum, On 
Capital and Labor. Forty years later, Pius XI avowed in his follow-up encyclical, 
Quadragesimo Anno (lit. “In the 40th Year”), that Rerum Novarum (lit. New 
Order) “laid down for all mankind the surest rules to solve aright that difficult 
problem of human relations called ‘the social question.’”  
These rules describe an economic model that soon gained wide acceptance 
as a Third Way: Equality is a cruel illusion; people are happiest when rightly 
placed in a legitimate hierarchy guided by the Church. Competition is spiritually 
demeaning, so business, labor, and the state must cooperate to set quotas, prices, 
and wages throughout designated vertically connected swathes of the economy 
called Corporations (workers and owners form one body, lat. corpus).  Each 
Corporation is governed by an Association, composed of government officials 
plus representatives of the Corporation’s two Syndicates: a business owners’ 
syndicate and a workers’ syndicate. Private property is a stewardship, 
legitimatized by owners’ obedience to Church and Association, but forfeited by 
competition. A Principle of Subsidiarity devolves authority unneeded at higher 
levels to the lowest feasible level throughout the hierarchy. This model came to be 
known as Corporatism.  
The Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression shattered popular support for 
liberal democracy, and corporatism  was the major alternative to socialism on 
offer. By substituting “Fascist Party” for “Church” throughout the above, 
Mussolini created the world’s first avowedly corporatist economy, though Il Duce 
sought and received papal endorsement of his social policies. Austria soon 
followed with a corporatist dictatorship of Catholic clerics who enacted the 
Church’s undistorted teachings. Vichy bought enthusiastic clerical support by 
embracing corporatism. Papal endorsement of their corporatist economies gave 
Iberian and Latin American dictators a legitimacy that persisted well into the 
cold-war era. After the war, corporatism spread across the former French, 
Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch colonial empires. Ataturk and the Lebanese 
Christian Falangists brought the secular and Catholic variants of corporatism to 
the Middle East, where Arab Ba’athist movements embraced the ideology.  
                                                
1 Throughout, we follow Leo in associating the term liberal with a philosophy extolling 
individualism, rationalism, and human freedom of choice. This accords with everyday use except 
in the United States, where liberal has come to mean “social democratic” or “progressive”. The 
Pope anticipated a global readership, and uses liberal to mean what American readers now call 
libertarian or classical liberal. For brevity, we beg the indulgence of American readers in 
accepting the more globally prevalent usage.  
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Just as liberal democracies and people’s republics fail to realize their 
ideals, corporatism has its compromisers and backsliders. But a less perfectly 
realized ideal can be a more powerful force, for its failing can be blamed on 
apostasy rather than intrinsic flaws. So it was with corporatism.  
Catholicism (and Islam) and French legal systems correlate strongly with 
enfeebled financial systems and retarded economic development (La Porta et al. 
1997; Stulz 2005). These correlations are too strong to ignore, but hard to explain. 
Catholicism and Islam have different values from many other religions, but they 
also differ markedly from each other. Moreover, Mohamed was a merchant and 
Novak (1983) describes most Protestant sects as roughly as anti-business as 
Rome. Lamoreaux (2005) describes French law as more supportive of 
industrialization than American law. Most puzzlingly, Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
find large robust financial systems in the early 20th century in Catholic countries 
and countries with French legal systems, and observe a mid-20th century atavism 
that explains to present cross-country correlations.  
Corporatism was Roman Catholic social doctrine from the 1890s to the 
1960s, and secular corporatism was equally dear to Anti-Cartesian French 
intellectuals of the late 19th and 20th centuries. We therefore posit a corporatist 
shadow upon Catholic countries, ex-colonies with French educated leaders, and 
perhaps many Islamic countries. Most economies with French legal codes are 
former colonies of France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, or the Netherlands. 
Napoleon ruled all of these mother countries; each adopted a variant of the 
Napoleonic Code and each passed that legal system along to all of its colonies. 
Catholic clerics ran most schools in Latin America, Spain, Portugal, the 
Philippines, and elsewhere; and Catholic missionaries ran schools throughout 
Africa, India, and much of East Asia. Corporatist economics was a core part of 
their curriculum, with the explicit objective of influencing future political leaders 
wherever possible. Colonial French native elites who missed out on Catholic 
missionary schools attended colonial academies replicating the curriculum of 
metropolitan France, where corporatist economics again took pride of place. We 
hypothesize that these educational efforts were successful, and therefore posit that 
empirical evidence linking financial and economic infirmity to Catholicism, 
Islam, or the Napoleonic Code may well actually capture a residual corporatist 
tradition. Indeed, a variable set to one for a French legal code or a Catholic or 
Islamic majority may well be a better proxy for a corporatist history than direct 
attempts to engineer such a variable from labor laws, price regulation, etc.  
In retrospect, theologians should have recognized something akin to the 
problem of theodicy (Leibnitz 1710): Why, in a universe governed by an 
omnipotent, omniscient and loving God is there such widespread suffering? 
Expecting a corporatist elite, even one composed of devout Catholics, to solve 
problems of social justice that a loving and all-powerful deity either cannot or will 
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not resolve seems an oddly antinomian indulgence of pride. Anti-Cartesian 
French intellectuals and generic dictators might readily be excused for 
succumbing to this foremost of the Seven Deadly Sins, but clerics ought to have 
known better. 
The failure of corporatism lies, in part, in its failure to accept human 
nature as it is. Catholic corporatism stresses a duty to God and the Church 
patriarchy. Secular corporatism stresses a moral duty to a Volk, or Nation. If such 
Anti-Cartesian feelings of duty were strong enough, as Leo XIII and Pius XI 
believed Catholic education could make them, a more hierarchical organization of 
society becomes feasible.   
Why this did not work is aptly summarized by the Italian intellectual 
Salvemini’s (1936) lament that "it is the state, i.e., the taxpayer, who has become 
responsible to private enterprise. In Fascist Italy the state pays for the blunders of 
private enterprise." In good times, "profit remained to private initiative"; but in 
bad times, "the government added the loss to the taxpayer's burden. Profit is 
private and individual. Loss is public and social." 2 Corporatist elites everywhere, 
Catholic or secular, were charged with setting “fair” prices, wages, and quotas, 
but found fairness coinciding with self-interest unexpectedly often Di Lorenzo 
1994). Like socialism, corporatism demanded too much of its elites.  
Corporatism’s failure also stems from a misunderstanding of the economic 
purpose of private property. Thus, The Economist editorialized (July 27, 1935) 
that Italian corporatism "only amounts to the establishment of a new and costly 
bureaucracy from which those industrialists who can spend the necessary amount, 
can obtain almost anything they want, and put into practice the worst kind of 
monopolistic practices at the expense of the little fellow who is squeezed out in 
the process." Wages and prices in a corporatist economy lose their ability to 
transmit information and create incentives to coordinate economic decisions. 
Absent these functions, private property loses its raison d’être and becomes 
nothing more than the guarantor of entrenched inequality socialists abhor.  
We sympathize with the popes who endorsed corporatism. Liberalism 
justifies self-interest, an overtly sinful “means”, with economic efficiency, a 
materialistic “end”. Soviet socialism was militantly atheist. Both ideologies left 
the Vatican understandably queasy, and their 19th and early 20th century 
incarnations were far less palatable than critics in 21st century liberal democratic 
welfare states might realize.  
The Roman Catholic Church has come a long way. Novak (1993, p 101) 
rightly states “we are all capitalists now, even the pope” and, for proof, cites 
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, wherein John-Paul II “declares the right of personal 
economic initiative to be a fundamental human right, second only to the right of 
                                                
2 Salvemini (1936), p. 416.  
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religious liberty, rooted (like religious liberty) in the image of the creator 
endowed in every human being.”3  
The term corporatism was resurrected by various postwar secular Third 
Ways, from the British Labour Party to Swedish Social Democrats. These groups 
adopted bits and pieces of the corporatist agenda, but are best styled 
neocorporatist, for none embraces the ideals of the genuine model. Indeed, most 
are better thought of as relatively minor variations of the liberal democratic 
welfare state. They have little in common with the full-blooded corporatism in the 
dictatorships of interwar Europe, postwar Latin American, and many post-
colonial era dictatorships throughout the third world. Philosophical arguments in 
favor of cartels run by elites, hereditary inequality, or state subsidies to big 
business became unpopular.  
But corporatism is undead. Mussolini boasted that "three-quarters of the 
Italian economic system has been subsidized by government" Salvemini (1936), 
and corporatism’s ghost lingers in the rational expectations of state-enforced 
cartels, state subsidies, and other favors that business tycoons and other elites hold 
in post-corporatist economies. Such expectations are not entirely unrequited 
anywhere, but “business-government cooperation” is an especially apt euphemism 
for corruption in many countries to which we ascribe a corporatist legacy (Faccio 
2006; Faccio et al. 2006; Haber 2000; Haber et al. 2008; Wiarda 1981, 2004). 
Governments wishing limit corruption might consider exorcising this ghost.   
2.  Credo 
Corporatism is a body of normative economics promoted by the Roman Catholic 
Church from the late 19th century through the mid 20th century as a Third Way, 
in overt opposition to Protestant liberalism and atheist socialism.4 In truth, much 
of the model predates Leo’s encyclical, and is really due to 19th century 
academics disenchanted with liberalism and fearful of socialism – anti-Cartesian 
philosophers romanticizing medieval Europe’s feudal guilds. However, the 
church’s explicit endorsement surely moved corporatism from seminar rooms to 
presidential palaces. Sermons from Catholic pulpits throughout Europe 
legitimized variants of corporatism in Fascist Italy, theocratic Austria, Falangist 
Spain, Portugal’s Estado Novo, and Vichy France. The Iberian variants spread 
throughout Latin America, and a Phalange movement took root in Maronite 
Catholic Lebanon. Ataturk’s New Turk movement and Arab Ba’athist regimes 
also drew explicitly upon corporatist thinking.  
                                                
3 On John-Paul’s views about capitalism, see Houk and Williams (1983).  
4 This section draws heavily on Williamson (1985) and references therein, and on the texts of the 
various papal encyclicals.  
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More recently, a broadened usage attaches corporatism to any non-
socialist form of state planning, such as postwar French dirigisme, Swedish social 
democracy, and the British Labour Party’s 1970s industrial policies (Williamson 
1985). The term has thus grown fuzzy. For clarity, we adhere to the original usage 
of corporatism, but acknowledge as neocorporatist certain elements in this 
broader range of economic models. Corporatism in its original sense is 
identifiable through four key characteristics.5  
Fundamentalist Corporatism 
First, corporatism endorses hierarchy based on innate human inequality. The 
Catholic Church legitimizes ethically ordained and rigidly hierarchical chain of 
authority with the Pope and Vatican at the apex. Similarly, corporatism entrusts 
economic power to an ethically superior elite. Leo envisioned an elite made 
selfless by Roman Catholic teachings; but elites of loyal Fascists, Ba’athists, or 
military officers work equally well – or badly. All that is required of the elite is 
that they act solely for the greater good.  
The corporatist state is charged with regulating individual behavior to 
protect this social order, so that the elite can direct resources to provide all with 
their accustomed livelihoods and standards of living. This charge gives 
corporatism its metaphysical content and its moral force. The evil in liberalism is 
therefore not indifference to poverty, but its alienation of workers from a just and 
natural hierarchy, which would end strikes and all other manifestations of class 
conflict. Corporatism thus distinguishes itself from socialism in explicitly 
rejecting egalitarianism and class identification.  
Second, to safeguard this social order, the state, businesses, and labor must 
cooperate. This harmony is achievable only if an ethically superior elite governs 
all three; for otherwise power might be abused. Moreover, this cooperation 
constrains the role of the state, for policies that would disrupt society’s innate 
order are unacceptable, even if democratically endorsed by an erring electorate. 
Corporatism thus endorses authoritarianism – not as an end, but as a means to 
protect a legitimate social order ordained by God, or in Fascist and National 
Socialist corporatism, by a Nation’s patrimony. Corporatist writers seem to agree 
broadly that democracy is undesirable because it treats all votes equally. 
Somewhat inconsistently, most also see corporatism resolving all conflict and 
achieving a consensus; others charge the state with imposing harmony. 
The Church clearly endorsed an authoritarian line: the Discussion Club 
Outline circulated with Quadragesimo Anno explains that the state would direct, 
though not absorb, the activity of small and large organizations to establish “a 
                                                
5 The following summarizes the contents of Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno, drawing 
on Williamson (1985, 1989) and Wiarda (1981, 2004).  
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better hierarchical order” and “to abolish class conflicts and promote harmony.”6
Corporatism thus distinguishes itself from liberalism in rejecting social mobility 
and democracy.  
Third, corporatism offers a qualified endorsement of private property – 
owners must use their property morally – and of wage labor; and thus explicitly 
rejects socialist ideals. The economy’s Commanding Heights are not controlled 
solely by public officials, but shared with Associations that also represent 
industrialists and workers. A corporatist economy might be divided into several 
dozen major vertically related product chains, each called a Corporation, evoking 
the Latin corpus (body) and thus literally meaning embodiment. A Corporation is 
a coalescing of everyone in the product chain into one body. Each Corporation 
thus encompasses the workers and owners of raw materials producers, 
intermediate goods makers, consumer goods producers, retailers, and servicing 
industries. Each Corporation is governed by an Association of carefully selected 
ethically superior representatives of its industrialists and workers. Each 
Association sets just prices, wages and production quotas for all goods in the 
product chain so as to protect everyone’s traditional occupation and standard of 
living. Each such Association also controls worker training, employment, and 
such social assistance as workers or their families might truly need. An economy-
wide Association, containing representatives of each Corporation, determines just 
prices and production levels of intermediate goods that pass between 
Corporations. All quotas, prices, and wages are enforced by the police power of 
the state; and competition is an abuse of private property – explicitly sinful in the 
Catholic variant and treasonous in the secular variant of corporatism. Imports are 
limited or prohibited, for their prices would otherwise disrupt the above 
arrangements. Corporatism thus distinguishes itself from socialism by endorsing 
private property – all the firms in the Corporations are to be privately owned – 
and from liberal capitalism by rejecting market-based wages, prices, employment, 
and production levels as abuses of private property. 
Fourth, corporatism applies a Principle of Subsidiary: Authority subsides 
to the lowest feasible level of the hierarchy. The Church safeguards souls, and 
must retain power over all matters it judges necessary to this end, but should leave 
other matters to the prince. The prince retains powers he deems necessary for 
governing his realm, but other matters subside to the Corporations. These retain 
powers they deem necessary to setting their just wages, prices and quotas, but 
other matters subside to industrialists. Industrialists retain such powers as they 
need to govern their businesses, but details subside to shop foremen. These charge 
master tradesmen with tasks, but leave them to get on with it, and so on down to 
the lowest worker – who is still master in his house, and due unquestioning 
                                                
6 Cramer and Leathers (1981), p. 768.  
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obedience from his wife and children. This Principle of Subsidiary devolves 
authority as the lowest point in the hierarchy consistent with the smooth 
functioning of the system. It thus reinforces the hierarchy at the core of the 
corporatist model, and thus distinguishes corporatism from the central planning of 
socialism and the alienation of liberalism.  
Some corporatist writers add to this list – for example requiring each 
Corporation to run a comprehensive social safety net for its workers of the sort 
they associate with medieval guilds. Others qualify the above points by, for 
example, not explicitly rejecting democracy but accepting its redundancy after a 
corporatist harmony emerges. Some corporatist writers explicitly demand state 
enforcement of just wages and prices; others foresee universal consensus on just 
wages and prices, and consequently no need for their enforcement.  
However, the main tenets listed above characterize the full-blooded 
corporatism of the interwar era. They accurately describe interwar Austria under 
the clerical-fascist dictatorship of Fr. Engelbert Dollfuss (Bischof and Pelinka 
1996). They apply, with modifications, to Fascist Italy (Mussolini and Orano. 
1934; Mussolini 1935, 1936) and Nazi Germany (Weitz 1997); where lapsed 
Catholic dictators pushed the Church aside to enforce secular versions of 
corporatism. They quite adequately describe Vichy France (Fine 1971), along 
with the Iberian (Royo 2001) and Latin American (Malloy 1977; Haber 2000) 
dictatorships, whose devoutly Catholic dictators ran corporatist economies with 
papal blessings.  
Reformed Corporatism 
Elements of interwar corporatist thought persisted and found new vigor in the 
1970s in many high income countries in Europe and elsewhere. We follow 
Williamson (1985) in calling these ideas neocorporatist because they draw only 
selectively from the full range of corporatist prescriptions.7 These elements 
typically include centralized wage-setting, labor union leaders’ involvement in 
government policy, labor market regulation, or some mixture of the above 
(Kenworthy 2002). Kenworthy links centralized wage-setting to lower 
unemployment rates across high income countries in the 1970s and 1980s, though 
not the 1990s; and argues that this practice internalizes an externality that 
otherwise mars liberal labor markets. That externality arises when each individual 
union presses for higher wages, forcing output prices up and thereby depressing 
employment in general. Greater union involvement in policy correlates across all 
three decades with lower unemployment.  
                                                
7 Heinze and Schmid (1997) refer to tripartite wage negotiations in German Länder as 
mesocorporatism. . 
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Labor market failures are a well established problem (Freeman 1988; 
Lazear 1995; Besley and Burgess 2004; Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia, and Pissarides 
2000; Heckman and Pages-Serra 2000; Ichniowski, Freeman, and Lauer 1989; 
and others). Thus, practices such as those described by Al-Marhubi and Willett. 
(1995), Cameron (1984), Havrilesky and Granato (1993), Kenworthy (2002), and 
others may indeed have welfare improving effects. However, these policies are 
arguably more social democratic than corporatist (Roe 2000; Pagano and Volpin 
2001; Alesina and Glaeser 2004); for they generally do not entail the 
comprehensive industry cartelization, incumbent control over entry, trade 
autarchy, massive subsidy programs, and hierarchical inequality that distinguishes 
corporatism from socialism.  
Moreover, the high-income countries in Kenworthy (2002) and like 
studies are also all highly open, so wages cannot stray too far from globally 
competitive productivity-adjusted levels. Indeed, expanding the sample to include 
developing countries, Botero et al. (2004) find more heavily regulated labor 
markets correlated with higher unemployment, especially of the young; and find 
this effect most pronounced in countries with French legal system legacies.  
We recognize the legitimacy of these and similar studies, but view them as 
studying neocorporatism. Their appropriation of the term corporatism to 
summarize a range of labor market restrictions is in step with recent usage, but 
differs from our usage fundamentally. For example, countries like Australia and 
Sweden, which never experienced an avowedly corporatist economic 
reorganization nonetheless score high on the corporatism indicators used in these 
studies. Our focus is on the institutional footprints of a genuine full-fledged 
corporatist experience, not of essentially liberal or social democratic governments 
tinkering with labor markets.  
A second important caveat is that Catholic teachings have become more 
accepting of both capitalism and liberalism in recent decades (Novak 1993). John-
Paul II, in his Laborem Exercens encyclical celebrates the 90th anniversary of 
Rerum Novarum by condemning not free market economics, but “the error of 
economism, that of considering human labour solely according to its economic 
purpose … [rather than] the spiritual and the personal” [§13]; and teaches that 
“capital should be at the service of labour and not labour at the service of capital” 
[§23]. A decade later, in Centesimus Annus, he endorses a “struggle against an 
economic system … upholding the absolute predominance of capital … in 
contrast to the free and personal nature of human work.” He interprets his 
predecessor as having “proposed as an alternative … not the socialist system, 
which in fact turns out to be State capitalism, but rather a society of free work, of 
enterprise and of participation. Such a society is not directed against the market, 
but demands that the market be appropriately controlled by the forces of society 
and by the State, so as to guarantee that the basic needs of the whole of society are 
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satisfied.” To clarify, the pontiff adds that “[t]he Church acknowledges the 
legitimate role of profit as an indication that a business is functioning well” [§35]. 
Following John-Paul’s lead, Benedict XVI’s encyclical Caritas in Veritate
criticizes free markets relatively sparingly: “if the market is governed solely by 
the principle of the equivalence in value of exchanged goods, it cannot produce 
the social cohesion that it requires in order to function well. Without internal 
forms of solidarity and mutual trust, the market cannot completely fulfill its 
proper economic function” [§35]. Reasonable economists can scarcely object; 
especially after reading Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno.  
Corporatism of the Elect 
Frank Knight (1939 p. 418) channels many of the era’s economists in disparaging 
Quadragesimo Anno as “religious exhortation without knowledge or 
understanding – of well-meaning people attempting to meddle with the workings 
of extremely complicated and sensitive machinery which they do not understand.” 
History validates Knight, in that the Church backpedaled energetically in 
subsequent decades. 
However, corporatism was not without its high profile academic 
proponents. Some were clearly “useful idiots” in the sense of Lenin.8 But one 
prominent and thoughtful proponent of the pope’s corporatism merits serious 
consideration: Joseph Schumpeter. In a 1945 speech in Montreal (Prime and 
Henderson 1975 pp. 297-8) Schumpeter exhorts that postwar economics be 
organized “in the sense advocated by Quadragesimo Anno [because] this doctrine 
does not call upon false theories [but] recognizes all the facts of a modern 
economy [and] shows us the functions of private initiative in a new framework.” 
Challenging Knight’s critique, Schumpeter continues “the Pope was not speaking 
from “up in the clouds”. He was showing us a practical method to solve practical 
problems of immediate urgency.”  
As an example, Schumpeter explains “what happens in a depression. 
Business firm A cannot work because business firm B is not working; B can’t 
because C finds itself incapable of producing; and so on. No single firm can, by 
its own action, break the “vicious circle”.” Whence the closing down of an entire 
industry, a closing down that ends only too easily in the ruin which menaces all 
enterprises and of which the workers are the victims.”  
Schumpeter’s example echo’s Keynes’ concerns about insufficient 
aggregate demand, and presages Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Murphy et al. (1989), 
and others who advocate a “big push” of state orchestrated industrialization to 
solve precisely such coordination problems and kick-start rapid growth in low-
                                                
8 Lenin (1966, p. 449) so describes U.S. President Woodrow Wilson to activists of the Moscow 
Organization of the Revolutionary Communist Party of Britain (RCPB) on December 6, 1920.  
9
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income countries. But Schumpeter sees no role for the state, and prefers the 
vertical organization of firms in industries because “the corporate action of 
professional associations, by the fact that it guarantees to every individual 
enterprise that it will not be the only one to advance, that consequently it will find 
in the production of others the demand for its output.”9  
Differentiating this from socialist planning, he summarizes: “the corporate 
principle organizes, but does not regiment. It is opposed to all systems with a 
centralizing tendency and to all bureaucratic regimentation.” Schumpeter thus 
would have private sector leaders get together to coordinate a “big push” without 
state planners. Morck and Nakamura (2007) suggest that the very large and highly 
diversified business groups found in rapidly industrializing economies (Khanna 
and Yafeh 2007) form precisely to do this.  
Highlighting Schumpeter’s stress on organization over regimentation, 
Cramer and Leathers (1981) argue that Schumpeter likely did not consider Nazi 
Germany or Fascist Italy “legitimate corporate societies.” Instead, they posit 
“Latin America (except for Chile)” as more like what he had in mind, and draw 
attention to Newton’s (1974) concept of a natural corporatism developing 
“within, or parallel to the conventional and more or less constitutional political 
pressures.”10  
Schumpeter clearly knew what full-fledged corporatism entailed. He 
served as Austrian Finance Minister in a 1919 elected coalition government of 
Social Democrats and the Christian Social Party. He resigned after a few months, 
but almost certainly because of his failure to control inflation, rather than any 
disquiet over the Christian Social party’s overtly Catholic corporatist agenda. 
Though no fascist – he fled for the United States in 1932 - Schumpeter clearly 
rejected egalitarianism, and instead advocated subordinating the will of the 
masses and the state, both fixated on the short term, to entrepreneurs intent on 
building private dynasties. Leadership in this, he explains is lacking “if each 
applies himself to constantly drawing up a balance sheet of his personal and 
immediate benefits and costs at any given time.”11 Most discordant to modern 
neoclassical economists, he then denounces “utilitarian philosophy” as an 
“irreligious (and perfectly stupid) rationalism” that legitimizes “no other 
regulatory principle than that of individual egoism” and promotes “a spirit of 
social irresponsibility.” This, he explains, courts disaster by discouraging 
leadership.  
                                                
9 Quoted in Prime and Henderson (1975), pp. 297-8. 
10 Quoted in Cramer and Leathers (1981) pp. 752-3. 
11 Quotes are from Prime and Henderson (1975), p. 296.  
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3.  Genesis 
Liberalism in the 19th century was markedly anticlerical (Fanfani 1935; 
Manhattan 1947). Centuries of bloody sectarian conflicts, massacres, Wars of 
Religion and Inquisitions failed to quench this bloodthirst. Only after rival 
Catholic and Protestant powers ruined much of Europe in the Thirty Years War 
(1618-48) did religious militancy give way to liberal ideals. The Enlightenment 
that followed displeased the Church – Pius IX attached a Syllabus of Errors to his 
1864 papal encyclical Quanta Cura damning democracy, human rights, 
rationalism and bible societies; and proclaiming absolute monarchy God's chosen 
form of government.  
The Papal States of central Italy were, after all, a prominent outpost of 
absolute monarchy – a theological dictatorship and the pope’s fief by feudal right. 
When such exhortations failed to turn the tide, the Church instead embraced 19th
century Anti-Cartesianism – an intellectual backlash against French 
Revolutionary chaos and Dickensian industrialization. These intellectuals 
glorified Europe’s lost medieval Eden and pined for a social justice free of 
Enlightenment values.  
Victorian Anti-Cartesians lamented what Weber called the 
“disenchantment of the world” – a bottom-line rationalism created by capitalism 
that enabled scientific skepticism. While rationalists celebrated this (e.g. Simmel 
1900), poets, philosophers, and novelists pined for a bygone golden age of spirit-
lifting harmony (Muller 2009). The economic theories of Austrian Catholic 
theologian Baron Karl Freiherr von Vogelsang (1981, 1883, 1883/84, 1884, 
1886), especially, portray a medieval Europe of utopian harmony, with every 
class assigned well-crafted rights and duties to every other class.12 Vogelsang’s 
call for renewed Christian fervor to rebuild this lost Eden scarcely displeased the 
Vatican.  
Thus the preamble to the 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo 
XII blames the “prevailing moral degeneracy” on industry, science, and a false 
social leveling of masters and workmen amid worsening economic inequality. 
Exploiting the secular schism between socialists and liberals, Leo endorses both 
liberal criticisms of socialism and socialist criticisms of liberalism.  
Against socialism, Leo thunders of “upset and disturbance … in all 
classes”, the “intolerable and hateful a slavery [to which] citizens would be 
subjected,” and how “the door would be thrown open to envy, to mutual 
invective, and to discord; the sources of wealth themselves would run dry, for no 
one would have any interest in exerting his talents or his industry; and that ideal 
                                                
12 Vogelsang’s collected works are not readily available in English. Boyer (1995) explains them 
thoroughly, esp. discussing anti-Semitic content. 
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equality about which they entertain pleasant dreams would be in reality the 
leveling down of all to a like condition of misery and degradation.” Hayek could 
hardly have put it better.  
Against liberalism, Leo quotes Aquinas (1265/74): “Man should not 
consider his material possessions as his own, but as common to all, so as to share 
them without hesitation when others are in need.” 13 On the labor theory of value, 
Leo echoes Marx: “it is only by the labor of working men that States grow rich. 
Justice, therefore, demands that the interests of the working classes should be 
carefully watched over by the administration” [§34]. The pontiff demands state 
intervention, declaring that “it lies in the power of a ruler to benefit every class in 
the State, and … to promote to the utmost the interests of the poor” [§32]. 
Presaging postmodern literary critics, he denounces a system that would “misuse 
men as though they were things … for that is truly shameful” [§20]. Condemning 
markets, Leo laments “that working men have been surrendered, isolated and 
helpless, to the hardheartedness of employers and the greed of unchecked 
competition” [§3]. His disbelief in economic theory is scathing: “Wages, as we 
are told, are regulated by free consent, and therefore the employer, when he pays 
what was agreed upon, has done his part and seemingly is not called upon to do 
anything beyond. … To this kind of argument a fair-minded man will not easily 
or entirely assent; it is not complete” [§43].  
These twin evils thus demolished, Leo XII advocates a sweeping 
reorganization of the economy, neither liberal nor socialist, but reviving 
Vogelsang’s mystic medieval golden age of Catholic unity.14 Pius XI, in his 1931 
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno celebrating the 40th anniversary of Rerum 
Novarum, explains the historical basis of Leo’s vision “of the reconstruction and 
perfection of social order” thus: “For there was a social order once which, 
although indeed not perfect or in all respects ideal, nevertheless, met in a certain 
measure the requirements of right reason, considering the conditions and needs of 
the time. If that order has long since perished, that surely did not happen because 
the order could not have accommodated itself to changed conditions and needs by 
development and by a certain expansion, but rather because men, hardened by too 
much love of self, refused to open the order to the increasing masses as they 
should have done, or because, deceived by allurements of a false freedom and 
other errors, they became impatient of every authority and sought to reject every 
form of control.” 
That social order was medieval Europe, for Rerum Novarum explains how 
“history attests what excellent results were brought about by the artificers' guilds 
of olden times” and that “such unions should be suited to the requirements of this 
                                                
13 Summa Theologiae lla - llae, q. Ixvi, art. 2, Answer], cited in Rerum Novarum §22.  
14 Vogelsang was heavily involved in drafting the encyclical, and may well have authored much of 
it.  
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our age.” Evoking medieval guilds as blueprints, Leo calls for Associations 
“either of workmen alone, or of workmen and employers together” organized with 
the goal of “helping each individual member to better his condition to the utmost 
in body, soul, and property.” 15 To help their members in these ways, medieval 
guilds restricted entry, limited output, and fixed both prices and wages.  
Leo debunks the socialist error of presuming “class is naturally hostile to 
class, and that the wealthy and the working men are intended by nature to live in 
mutual conflict. So irrational and so false is this view that the direct contrary is 
the truth.” Calling for cooperation instead of conflict between capital and labor, 
Leo proclaims “it ordained by nature that these two classes should dwell in 
harmony and agreement, so as to maintain the balance of the body politic. Each 
needs the other: capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital.” 16 
 Guilds organized the medieval economy vertically, by industry and across 
classes, rather than horizontally, by class and across industries, as socialists 
advocated, and Rerum Novarum proposes a similar structure for late 19th century 
industrial economies: industry Associations vertically cartelizing each industrial 
product chain and distributing vertically integrated monopoly rents across 
employers and workers. Leo predicts few disputes over this distribution, for “it 
will be easy for Christian working men to solve it aright if they will form 
associations, choose wise guides, and follow on the path which with so much 
advantage to themselves and the common weal was trodden by their fathers 
before them.”  
Leo charged the State with enforcing these cartels, and with intervening 
further as necessary so “regulated wages ought not to be insufficient to support a 
frugal and well behaved wage-earner” [§42]. This intervention is morally justified 
to aid “wage-earners, since they mostly belong in the mass of the needy, should 
be specially cared for and protected by the government” [§37]. This, Leo declares, 
would render strikes “obviated by public remedial measures” [§39] for labor 
regulations would “lend their influence and authority to the removal in good time 
of the causes which lead to conflicts between employers and employed” [§39].  
In Quadragesimo Anno, Pius reaffirms all of the above, and goes on to 
blasts joint stock companies in ways modern advocates of corporate social 
responsibility still echo: “by hiding under the shelter of a joint name, the worst of 
injustices and frauds are penetrated; and that, too, directors of business 
companies, forgetful of their trust, betray the rights of those whose savings they 
have undertaken to administer” [§132].  But Pius has more fundamental problems 
with liberal free-market economics, writing that “from this source, as from a 
poisoned spring, have originated and spread all the errors of individualist 
economic teaching [§88]. Indeed, his problems are with the core of enlightenment 
                                                
15 Quotes from Rerum Novarum §49 and §57.  
16 Quotes from Rerum Novarum §19. 
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values: “when the principles of rationalism had been implanted and rooted in 
many minds, there quickly developed a body of economic teaching far removed 
from the true moral law, and, as a result, completely free rein was given to human 
passions.” [§133].  
Despite a paternalism that grates on modern ears, Rerum Novarum and its 
elaborations, including Quadragesimo Anno, were major advances in Catholic 
understanding of economics. Traditional Roman Catholicism “was adversarial to 
both commerce and manufacturing. It was aristocratic. The viewpoint … was 
favorable to inherited wealth (or wealth conferred by royal endowment); but it 
was quite dismissive of earned wealth” (Novak 1993). This viewpoint is 
understandable, for until Italian unification, the Pope was feudal Lord over the 
Papal States. In fairness, this view is older, for Viner (1991) writes that “[t]he 
early Christian fathers on the whole took a suspicious if not definitely hostile 
attitude towards the trade of merchants or middlemen, as being sinful or 
conducive to sin.” Catholic theologians merely embraced this attitude. Rerum 
Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno broke that embrace and ultimately 
straightened the path to Vatican II and John Paul II’s encyclical Sollicitudo Rei 
Socialis conceding [§41] that “the Church does not propose economic and 
political systems or programs, nor does she show preference for one or the other, 
provided that human dignity is properly respected and promoted, and provided 
she herself is allowed the room she needs to exercise her ministry” amid a broader 
Catholic acceptance of democracy and free markets (Woods 2005). But decades 
of Catholic blessings upon cartels and state intervention built sturdy institutions 
and mindsets.  
  
4.  Principles or Power 
To carry Rerum Novarum into public policy, the church formed a laic movement,
Popular Catholic Action. In 1901, Leo’s encyclical Graves de Communi 
restructured this movement into Christian Democracy: “the ensemble of Catholic 
doctrine, organization, and action in the field of popular social questions.”17  
This was risky, for previous Catholic experiments with democracy 
disquieted the Hierarchy. For example, the French counterrevolutionary and 
Catholic theologian Félicité Robert de Lamennais, dismayed by the bloody 
aftermath of the Revolution, used his newspaper L’Avenir (The Future) to 
propound a liberal democratic Catholicism. In horror, Gregory XVI responded 
with his 1832 encyclical Mirari Vos denouncing virtually everything L’Avenir
proposed: “liberty of the press, liberty of conscience, revolt against princes, the 
need of regenerating Catholicism, etc.” De Lamennais was ordered not to “discuss 
                                                
17 Catholic Encyclopedia (1917) article on “Christian Democracy”.  
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publicly questions which belonged to the authorities of the Church.”18 Bitter and 
broken, he died apostate.  
As the new century opened, liberalism remained heresy. The Catholic 
Encyclopedia of 1917 describes De Lamennais as posessing “an insight, confused 
but keenly felt” but “wrong, too, in believing that liberty was the positive 
foundation of everything.” To clarify, the Encyclopedia disparages L’Avenir’s 
motto "God and Liberty", explaining “either Liberty was superfluous, since that is 
already implied in God, or the phrase was illogical, since there can be no question 
of liberty unless it harmonizes with social order. And so de Lamennais and his 
movement ended in failure.” 19  
Leo’s Christian Democracy would avoid such errors. Liberal governments 
might permit the free expression of its philosophy, but Christian Democracy 
would vigorously oppose liberalism in all its guises. True to Rerum Novarum, 
Christian Democracy wed radical rightwing views on social issues – sex, 
abortion, and the role of women – to a seemingly leftish, but really medieval, 
mistrust of markets. Advocating Lordly paternalism on both economic and social 
issues, the new movement was at least more consistent than modern American 
liberals and conservatives, who often esteem paternalism in one sphere but not the 
other.  
 Christian Democratic movements, unions, and parties soon spread the 
gospel of Rerum Novarum to every country with rudimentary freedoms and 
significant Catholic populations. From Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain, Christian Democracy spread to Germany. In the Netherlands, these 
ideas renewed the Dutch Anti-Revolutionary Party, which fought against the 
ideals of the French Revolution; and in Sweden a Protestant revival proclaimed 
itself Christian Democratic. Pius XI does not exaggerate where, in Quadragesimo 
Anno, he writes that “The Apostolic voice did not thunder forth in vain. On the 
contrary, not only did the obedient children of the Church hearken to it with 
marveling admiration and hail it with the greatest applause, but many also who 
were wandering far from the truth, from the unity of the faith, and nearly all who 
since then either in private study or in enacting legislation have concerned 
themselves with the social and economic question.”  
Nor is he far from the truth in proclaiming that “with Leo's Encyclical 
pointing the way and furnishing the light, a true Catholic social science has 
arisen.” The church would now “establish a juridical and social order which will, 
as it were, give form and shape to all economic life.”20 Inspired by Rerum 
Novarum, Catholic academics would guide the development of labor law and a 
                                                
18 Catholic Encyclopedia (1917) article on “Félicité Robert de Lamennais”.  
19 Novak (1993, p. 75).  
20 Quadragesimo Anno §XX.  
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broad range of social policies. Their ideas would be taken up by reformers 
everywhere seeking Third Ways.  
Ultimately, however, Catholic parties failed to attract majority support in 
Europe and Latin America. Their choice was power through coalitions with 
socialists or liberals, or hectoring from opposition benches. The Vatican found 
Catholics who concerted with these diabolically inspired philosophies questioning 
the Church’s teachings, and feared they might slip into the error that destroyed de 
Lamennais (Manhattan 1947). Consequently, the Vatican forbade coalitions. 
Christian Democracy thus succeeded in airing the ideas in Rerum Novarum, but 
made little headway in implementing them.  
Democracy having failed it, the Church contemplated authoritarian 
alternatives. Novak (1993) rightly concedes that Catholic social teachings seem 
“to the Anglo Saxon ear… not at first glance easy to distinguish for the heavy-
handed political order which plans and directs the economy, and enforces the 
monistic cultural order enshrined in the corporatist states of socialism and 
fascism.” Leo and Pius both vehemently denounce socialism; and Novak, perhaps 
somewhat wishfully, extrapolates these denunciations to fascism by arguing that 
“Fascism … was a form of socialism – national socialism.” Leo is blunter, 
declaring that “the Church possesses a power [to] bring men to act from a motive 
of duty, to control their passions and appetites, to love God and their fellow 
men.”21 Catholic morals would thus prevent the abuse of power found in secular 
dictatorships.  
5.  Mussolini’s Corporatist Epiphany 
The Great War, the inequities of the Versailles Treaty, hyperinflations in the 
1920s, and the Great Depression in the 1930s reduced European liberal capitalism 
to intellectual rubble. Chronic high unemployment, annihilated savings, and 
middle classes reduced to poverty reenergized socialist and communist parties 
across the continent. Vilfredo Pareto (1922), dismayed at the “astonishing 
popularity of Marxism in Italy” and “progressive taxation to the disadvantage of 
the well-off … an arrangement in which taxes are voted by those who do not pay 
them,” saw Fascism “as a spontaneous and somewhat anarchical reaction of a part 
of the population to the ‘Red tyranny,’ which the government permitted to run 
rampant, leaving it to private individuals to defend themselves alone” (p. 148). 
Pareto died in 1924, shortly after Mussolini appointed him a senator, so his likely 
reaction to the full reality of Fascism remains debatable (Raico 1996; Cirillo 
2006).  
                                                
21 Rerum Novarum §26.  
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Raico (1996) argues persuasively that Pareto feared that democracy, 
unbalanced by emotional electorates and plutocratic special interests, would undo 
economic liberalism, and thought sacrificing political liberalism the lesser evil. 
Raico’s quotation from Edoardo Giretti, a leading interwar Italian liberal 
economist, well summarizes such thinking: “If Mussolini with his political 
dictatorship will give us a regime of greater economic freedom than that which 
we have had from the dominant parliamentary mafias in the last one hundred 
years, the sum of good which the country could derive from his government 
would surpass by far that of evil”.22 Certainly, Mussolini’s early rhetoric included 
liberal economic ideals (Raico 1996).  
Although wariness of the Soviet Union and unremitting Catholic 
denunciation of social democracy may well have held back proletarian 
revolutions, discredited liberal democratic governments lost their monopolies on 
the use of force as party militias took to the streets of Europe. In 1919, Italy’s 
elected government watched helplessly as Benito Mussolini organized armed 
squads, his Fasci di Combattimento, to battle the socialists who had expelled him 
from their ranks in 1914. Hundreds died in street fighting, and soon few Italian 
villages lacked a squad of black shirted Fasci. In 1922, with tens of thousands of 
black shirts marching on Rome, the king appointed Mussolini prime minister. The 
Fascists pushed through a new electoral bill giving the party with the largest vote 
two thirds of the seats in Parliament. The Vatican, apparently to ensure a Fascist 
triumph, began the dissolution of the Catholic Party, which formerly rivaled the 
socialists in parliament, and priests throughout Italy endorsed Mussolini. The 
socialists, cheated by massive electoral fraud, and decapitated by the murder of 
their leader Giacomo Matteotti, boycotted parliament.  
Mussolini proclaimed a one-party state, coextensive with the Fascist Party 
and set to work on the economy. One of his first decrees bailed out the Bank of 
Rome, to which the Holy See entrusted its funds. The Head of the Sacred College 
of Cardinals, ignoring intermittent murders of Catholic Party leaders, praised 
Mussolini’s “energetic devotion to his country, adding that the Duce had been 
chosen by God to save the nation and to restore her fortune” (Welk 1938). Amid 
rumors of an antifascist alliance of the Catholic and Socialist Parties, the pope 
extinguished the former, declaring Mussolini “sent by Providence.”23  
Mussolini (1932) is clear that his goal was order. He is explicit that 
“Fascism was not the nursling of a doctrine worked out beforehand with detailed 
elaboration; it was born of the need for action and it was itself from the beginning 
practical rather than theoretical.” But, over the years, he concedes, it became an 
“ordered series of doctrinal concepts, forming the Fascist politico doctrine - 
different from all others either of the past or the present day."  
                                                
22 Papa (1970), p. 67. 
23 Dec. 20, 1936.  
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In fact, few Fascist economic policies were genuinely new. Mussolini 
began with a thorough fiscal housecleaning. His first Minister of Finance, Alberto 
de Stefano, slashed income taxes, repealed inheritance and wealth taxes, cut 
spending, and privatized telephones. Investor confidence returned, and from 1922 
to 1926, the number of listed companies and their capital investment nearly 
doubled. Il Duce reacted to investment bank failures in the Great Depression with 
a 1936 Bank Law, which, echoing the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act in the United 
States, prohibited universal banks.  
One apparently unique Fascist innovation was, however, the state-
controlled pyramidal group of listed corporations. When Italy’s three major 
universal banks – Banca Commerciale, Credito Italiano and Banco di Roma – 
collapsed, il Duce nationalized them into a single holding company, the Istituto 
per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI, or Institute for Industrial Reconstruction). 
The IRI became a control pyramid, directly holding control blocks in a swathe of 
major Italian corporations, many of which held control blocks in other firms, 
which in turn held control blocks in yet other firms. 24 It is hard to overstate the 
brilliance of this move. The Fascists running the IRI, by voting these control 
blocks, essentially appointed the boards of directors of all these seemingly distinct 
firms. This, along with an ambient threat of violence against dissident officers and 
directors, gave the Party control over the governance of the private sector without 
overt nationalizations. Thus Mussolini (1936) could repeatedly boast that Fascism 
respects private property.  
The IRI oddly aligned the Fascist Party with shareholder rights. Thus, 
Knox notes how “the dictator found industrialists’ preferences for financial 
stability and modest profits over aggrandizement increasingly irritating”.25 To 
lock in control over the private sector, the Fascist State thus strengthened 
shareholder rights with the 1942 Civil and Commercial Code and Bankruptcy 
Law. The former guaranteed shareholders a mandatory annual report and meeting 
to elect directors; the latter strengthened shareholder rights, while weakening 
creditor rights by permitting discretionary court-supervised reorganizations, 
instead of liquidations.26 The courts were, of course, by now Fascist controlled. 
These reforms let IRI controlled firms invest heavily in unprofitable armaments, 
extend credit to loyal industrialists’ firms, and deny it to others. (Williamson 
1985, pp. 99-103)  
But usually, wherever Fascist policies strayed from the beaten path, they 
echoed Rerum Novarum – omitting sections on Catholic moral guidance. 
Mussolini (1936) proclaims Italy one national “Corporation … created with a 
view to increasing the wealth, political power, and well being of the Italian 
                                                
24 For details, see Aganin and Volpin (2005).  
25 Williamson (1985), p. 100. 
26 Aganin and Volpin (2005).  
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people” (p. 20). The national Corporation consisted of twenty-two vertically 
integrated industry Corporations, each comprising all the firms in a product chain 
from raw materials to a specified set of finished products, one of which was a 
Corporation of the self-employed.  
Supreme power over the Corporations, though vested with il Duce, was 
delegated to the appointed Fascist Grand Council, which Mussolini (1936) 
describes as “The Corporation.”27 He clarifies that “Corporations mean regulated 
economy and therefore also controlled economy, for there can be no regulation 
without control.” Thus, the Fascist Grand Council, together with the Fascist 
Party Organization directed the National Council of Corporations which, with its 
various subsidiary planning bodies, organized the economy. The National Council 
of Corporations, through the Ministry of Corporations, was responsible “for the 
collective regulation of economic relations and the unitary discipline of national 
production” by individual corporations.” Each Corporation had a board – 
composed of worker, and employer representatives, technical experts, and Party 
representatives – to set production quotas, wages, and intermediate and final good 
prices, all subject to Ministry of Corporations oversight.28  
In fact, this structure was used to lock in Party control over the economy, 
and concern for the spiritual ideals of corporatism – living wages, the preservation 
of traditional ways of life, etc. – was largely window dressing.29 Mussolini 
banned free labor unions, and Williamson (1985) summarizes his corporatist 
Charter of Labor as “a cynical piece of propaganda.” The Party intervened 
directly at every level – consistent with the letter of the Principle of Subsidiarity, 
in that higher powers decide how much authority subsides to lower ones, but 
surely not what most corporatist intellectuals envisioned. Mussolini (1936) 
explains that “everything that draws the citizen within the machinery of State is 
useful to the social and national aims of Fascism.” Soon, businesses grew 
dependent on innumerable subsidies, administered by a separate network of state 
organs. This dependency let the Party correct firm-level decisions whenever 
subsidiarity led to an undesirable outcome. 30  
Consistent with corporatist ideals, foreign trade was largely shut down so 
that the industry Corporations might manage prices. This also allowed Mussolini 
greater foreign policy freedom – for example, the League of Nations’ 1935 trade 
sanctions, imposed after Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia, were pointless.  
Mussolini’s advisors drew on their French corporatist professors, who 
echoed Vogelsang’s Anti-Cartesian medievalism. Thus, Sorel (1908) calls for 
industrial Associations (syndicats) to overthrow France’s liberal democracy. 
                                                
27 Page 23.  
28 For details and diagrams of this structure as it evolved over time, see Welk (1938).  
29See Williamson (1985), chapter 6.  
30 See Mussolini (1938), and Welk (1938) or Manhattan (1947) for critical analysis.  
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Duguit (1923) predicts in France a “vast Association movement which fills our 
epoch, extends to all classes of society, and tends to coordinate them into a 
harmonious whole.”31 Mann (2004) provides an excellent overview of how this 
educational lineage came to culminate in Nietzschean values of “will” and 
“struggle”, and legitimized Mussolini and other interwar fascist leaders.  
These educators may have been mere “useful idiots” (Lenin 1966), but 
their writings also echo non-economic ideals from Rerum Novarum. Liberalism 
and socialism both see the happiness of individuals as the goal of society, and 
argue about the instrumental value of the state. But Fascism, “accepts economic 
liberty merely as expedient method, a concession made to the individual by 
society in the interest of the social group as a whole, a concession which may, 
whenever necessary, be revoked”, a position little different from the pope’s. 32  
Regardless, the Vatican accepted Mussolini. He not only accepted Church 
social teachings, but, unlike democratically accountable Catholic politicians, 
could actually implement them. In return for Church endorsement in the Lateran 
Agreement of 1929, Mussolini recognized the independence of the Vatican State; 
pledged financial compensation for the Papal States the Vatican lost in Italian 
unification; established Catholicism as the state religion; mandated religious 
education; subjected textbooks and teachers to Church vetoes; subsidized the 
clergy and religious orders; forbade books, papers, and films banned by the 
Church; and made the criticism or insult of Catholicism a penal offence.  
Discord between Party and Church arose primarily over education – the 
Church wanted total control – and to a lesser extent, over the killing of Catholic 
politicians by Fascist death squads.33 Thus, Plus XI had to smuggle his 1931 
encyclical, Non Abbiamo Bisogno abroad for dissemination; although it thanks the 
Party for its many reforms, it also criticizes Fascist education policy and violence 
against Catholic Action members who disobeyed the Hierarchy and continued 
opposing Mussolini. Pius explains: “We have not only refrained ourselves from 
formal and explicit condemnations, but on the contrary we have gone so far as to 
believe possible and to favour compromises which others would have deemed 
inadmissible. We have not intended to condemn the Party and the regime as such. 
We have intended to condemn those things in the programme and in the activities 
of the Party which have been found to be contrary to Catholic doctrine and 
practice.” Children at Catholic schools said grace before meals thus: “Duce, I 
thank you for what you give me to make me grow healthy and strong, O Lord 
God, protect the Duce so that he may be long preserved for Fascist Italy.”34  
                                                
31 Duguit (1923), p. 9. 
32 Quoted by Welk (1938); see also Manhattan (1947, esp. c. 9). 
33 Manhattan (1947), p. 122. 
34 Manhattan (1947), p. 123. 
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 Thus, the Vatican legitimized Mussolini, who reciprocated with special 
status for the Church. Fascism, searching for philosophical depth, incorporated 
Catholic social teachings and put into actual practice the ideas outlined in Rerum 
Novarum, many of which Mussolini (1936) recapitulates in The Corporate State. 
The Catholic theologian Fanfani (1935) reciprocated with a ringing endorsement 
of Italian corporatism that assigned primary credit to the Church. Nonetheless, 
Novak (1993) is probably correct in writing that “Mussolini’s followers bellowed 
in sour rage against Quadragesimo Anno” (p. 75), for the pope’s insistence on 
Catholic teaching, rather than Fascist discipline guiding corporatist institutions 
doubtless genuinely annoyed the dictator. However, a growing influence of 
nationalists like Alfredo Rocco and Luigi Federzoni over the Party largely 
squelched anticlericalism by 1929 (O’Brian 1981; Pollard, 1985); and Margiotta-
Broglio (1966) recounts Mussolini’s transformation from a fierce anti-Catholic to 
a shrewd “son of the Church.”35  
6.  Evangelical Corporatism 
Mussolini (1936) proclaimed Fascist Italy the vanguard of a global renewal.36
“Today,” he proclaims, “we bury economic liberalism.” With the Great 
Depression dragging on, he predicts “There is no doubt that, in view of the 
general crisis of capitalism, the Corporate solution will force itself to the fore 
everywhere.” For corporatism to succeed, he lists three preconditions: 
1.  “A single political party” must be entrenched. Otherwise, politics might 
distort government policy.”  
2. “There must be a totalitarian State, a State which by absorbing the energy, 
interests, and aspirations of the people, may transform and uplift them”. 
This is so corporatist decisions, once made, are carried out.”  
3. There must be “An atmosphere of strong ideal tension,” which exists in 
Italy because “This is an age in which arms are crowned by victory, …” 
Deliberately enigmatic, this perhaps commends terror as usefully limiting 
individualism. Certainly, Mussolini (1936) repeatedly stresses “discipline” 
as needed to expunge “liberal” self-interest from Italy.  
Pius XI was clearly thrilled with corporatist success in Fascist Italy, and 
sought to renew Catholicism everywhere with this social agenda. It is worth 
quoting at length from his famous 1931 encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno: 
                                                
35 Margiotta-Broglio (1966), p. 52. 
36 Quotes are from Mussolini (1936), pp. 23-25. 
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§91.  Recently, as all know, there has been inaugurated a special system of 
syndicates and corporations of the various callings which in view of the 
theme of this Encyclical it would seem necessary to describe here briefly 
and comment upon appropriately.  
 §92.  The civil authority itself constitutes the syndicate as a juridical personality 
in such a manner as to confer on it simultaneously a certain monopoly-
privilege, since only such a syndicate, when thus approved, can maintain 
the rights (according to the type of syndicate) of workers or employers, 
and since it alone can arrange for the placement of labor and conclude so-
termed labor agreements. Anyone is free to join a syndicate or not, and 
only within these limits can this kind of syndicate be called free; for 
syndical dues and special assessments are exacted of absolutely all 
members of every specified calling or profession, whether they are 
workers or employers; likewise all are bound by the labor agreements 
made by the legally recognized syndicate. Nevertheless, it has been 
officially stated that this legally recognized syndicate does not prevent the 
existence, without legal status, however, of other associations made up of 
persons following the same calling.  
 §93.  The associations, or corporations, are composed of delegates from the two 
syndicates (that is, of workers and employers) respectively of the same 
industry or profession and, as true and proper organs and institutions of 
the State, they direct the syndicates and coordinate their activities in 
matters of common interest toward one and the same end.  
§94.  Strikes and lock-outs are forbidden; if the parties cannot settle their 
dispute, public authority intervenes.  
 §95.  Anyone who gives even slight attention to the matter will easily see what 
are the obvious advantages in the system. We have thus summarily 
described: The various classes work together peacefully, socialist 
organizations and their activities are repressed, and a special magistracy 
exercises a governing authority. … 
  
Pius does not criticize the Fascist state, but recounts that others may 
harbor reservations, for §95 concludes “We are compelled to say that to Our 
certain knowledge there are not wanting some who fear that the State, instead of 
confining itself as it ought to the furnishing of necessary and adequate assistance, 
is substituting itself for free activity; that the new syndical and corporative order 
savors too much of an involved and political system of administration; and that 
(in spite of those more general advantages mentioned above, which are of course 
fully admitted) it rather serves particular political ends than leads to the 
reconstruction and promotion of a better social order.”  
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Pius reassures the faithful in §96 that this fear can be avoided if the state is 
directed by “those sons of Ours whom Catholic Action imbues with Catholic 
principles and trains for carrying on an apostolate under the leadership and 
teaching guidance of the Church in this field also that We have described, as in 
every other field where moral questions are involved and discussed, can never 
forget or neglect through indifference its divinely imposed mandate to be vigilant 
and to teach.” Recall that Mussolini (1936), in contrast, prescribes state terror and 
“discipline”.  
Catholic apologists have sacrificed forests elaborating on Quadragesimo 
Anno, to prove Pius rejected Fascism. Recall Novak’s (1975) stretching of the 
encyclical’s condemnation of socialism to cover National Socialism (p. 75). Other 
Catholic intellectuals own up - thus von Nell-Bruening (1971), who helped the 
pope draft this encyclical, regrets that he and the pope insufficiently criticized 
each others’ contributions.  
But Mussolini, not Pius, was likely corporatism’s greatest advertisement. 
The socialist dictatorship in Russia felt no disquiet seizing control of businesses – 
that, after all, was the whole point of socialism. Non-socialist dictators also want 
total control of the economy, but without trespassing overtly on private property. 
Mussolini showed how corporatism permits this léger-de-main, and so makes a 
totalitarian fascist dictatorship feasible.  
  
National Socialist Germany 
Hitler, like Mussolini, took charge of an economy in deep depression, and at first 
enacted arguably sensible reforms. Corporate income taxes were cut, capital 
investment made tax deductible, monetary policy reformed, and unemployment 
attacked via defense spending, public works and the numerous make-work 
programs of the Reichsanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und 
Arbeitslosenversicherung (the RfAA, or Reich Institution for Placement and 
Unemployment Insurance).  
But a corporatist framework was also rapidly deployed.37 This was likely 
concordant with public opinion at the time, for Mierzejewski (1998) documents 
strong anti-liberal sentiments prevailing in the Weimar Republic. In 1933, the 
Reichswirtschaftsministerium (Reich Economy Ministry) assumed the power “to 
suspend the creation of new enterprises and to fix the productive capacity of 
existing enterprises in any industry. The same year, that ministry undertook “to 
unite enterprises into associations, cartels, pacts, or similar agreements, or to join 
them to consortiums already existing, with a view to regulating the market, when 
this union or fusion seems necessary in the interests of the enterprises, of 
                                                
37 What follows is distilled from Fohlin (2005), Guérin (1936), Silverman (1998), Weitz (1997), 
and Woolston (1941).  
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production as a whole, and of the community.”38 Within months, the economy 
was partitioned into twenty-eight employer-employee industry Corporations, all 
controlled by the Reich Economy Ministry.  
As in Italy, these Corporations were only one avenue for extending Party 
control throughout the private sector. Make-work programs soon proved 
inadequate in solving Germany’s unemployment crisis, and after 1933 the RfAA 
became a forced labor allocation authority – authorized to assign workers to any 
business or state project, first for a limited period and, after 1939, indefinitely.39
The allocation of forced labor became a form of business subsidy. In 1934, the 
Party took control of import and export licenses, and their allocation became 
another way of controlling businesses. In the mid 1930s, price setting migrated 
from the industry Corporations to the Reich Economy Ministry, and “price 
regulating commissioners”, assigned squads of brown shirts, enforced fixed prices 
with heavy fines, forced closures, and violence. After the Reichsbank took control 
of all savings banks in 1934, it controlled the allocation of virtually all household 
savings, and could starve uncooperative owners’ firms of loans and reward loyal 
industrialists with loans subsidized by forced savings. To this end, savings 
account withdrawals were sharply limited in 1935, and taking over ten marks out 
of Germany became a capital offense in 1936.  
One decidedly innovative feature of National Socialist corporatism was its 
use of universal banks to lock in state control over most of the private sector, 
while leaving it privately owned.40 In Germany, stock brokerage services and 
banking services are provided by universal banks. The 1937 Aktiengesetz 
(Shareholder Law) forced investors to forego anonymity to retain their voting 
rights. Shareholders who opted to remain anonymous automatically delegated 
their voting rights to the universal banks through which they bought their shares.  
This gave the top managers of a handful of universal banks voting control 
over listed firms whose shareholders opted not to reveal their identity. Since most 
traded shares were in bearer form, this amounted to much of the private sector. 
Bailouts in the banking crisis of 1931 gave the Reich voting control blocks over 
the universal banks – 90% of Dresdner Bank, 70% in Commerz und Privatbank, 
and 35% in Deutsche Bank und Diskonto Gesellschaft – and thus over most listed 
firms. When the banks were subsequently privatized, Nazi directors dominated 
their boards and Party control was locked in. 
One wrinkle in this arrangement was the Mehrstimmrechtsaktien, or 
multiple voting share. During the Weimar Republic, these grew commonplace to 
preserve insider control in family firms that opted to issue more shares. In other 
cases, they took the form of Vorratsaktien, or treasury shares – legally issued but 
                                                
38 Guérin (1936), p. 215. 
39 Silverman (1998) p. 218.  
40 For more detail re the following paragraphs, see Fohlin (2005). 
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not yet sold to investors. These could be allocated quickly to insiders should they 
suddenly need more votes to fend off a raider. Fohlin (2005) shows family firms 
quite important in 1930s Germany, and that roughly 40% of listed firms had 
multiple voting shares of one sort or the other in 1934. This was a problem for the 
Nazis because multiple voting shares could give the firm’s insiders a majority of 
the votes, even where universal banks voted most of the shares. Multiple vote 
shares were therefore abolished by 1937, though some exceptions were 
grandfathered in.  
The 1937 law further proclaimed the Führerprinzip, the principle that a 
corporation should be run not for its shareholders, but for all its stakeholders – 
especially the Reich and Führer.41 This not only enshrined an utter rejection of 
liberal individualism (Silverman, 1998), but freed Party-appointed directors of 
narrow shareholder concerns like profits.  
Nazi Germany not only erected corporatist economic institutions, but 
defended them with echoes of Catholic denunciations of liberal individualism. 
Thus, Hitler (1925) writes "The Aryan is not greatest in his mental qualities, [but 
is noblest nonetheless, for he] willingly subordinates his own ego to the 
community and, if the hour demands, even sacrifices it."42 The dictator’s Austrian 
Catholic roots arguably also show in the mystical pageantry of Nazi state 
ceremonies, which Voegelin (1938) likens to Catholic rituals.  
A seeming economic miracle ensued, with most of Germany’s six million 
unemployed rapidly rejoining the workforce. Silverman (1998) examines labor 
market policy in detail, and argues that, despite statistical manipulation and 
remilitarization absorbing many unemployed, the recovery was real. However, the 
success was largely due to forced labor raising employment, and so is hardly a 
ringing endorsement of corporatism.43  
Clericofascist Austria 
While Italian and German corporatism both kept their distance from the Church, 
Austrian corporatism was indistinguishable from the Catholic Church (Bischof 
1996). Vogelsang’s Anti-Cartesian call for a medieval renewal resounded 
especially loudly in his native Austria, whose aristocracy and officer class united 
to support his disciple, Carl Lüger, and his Christian Social movement. In 1890, 
Lüger won election as mayor of Vienna, though probably by campaigning against 
Jews more than by espousing Vogelsang’s theories (Manhattan, 1950).  
                                                
41 See §70 I AktG 37.  
42 DiLorenzo (1994) discusses the economic purposes of these slogans.  
43Weitz (1997) suggests monetary policy also mattered, but this also fails to recommend 
Corporatism. 
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Under the Prelate Ignaz Seipel, the Christian Social party ruled Austria 
through the 1920s, and implemented Vogelsang’s vision with the help of its 
Heimwehr (Home Guard) militia of unemployed youths. Seipel retained his 
clerical office, ruling Church and State with equal scorn for socialism and 
liberalism. The Christian Social government subordinated all political, economic, 
and social issues to ecclesiastical considerations, in a Catholic approximation of 
the most extreme of modern Islamist regimes, all the while building a corporatist 
economy along by-now familiar lines. Seipel’s policies so delighted the Vatican 
that he was asked to help draft Quadragesimo Anno.44  
In 1933, at the nadir of the Great Depression, Seipel’s successor, 
Engelbert Dolfuss, merged the Christian Social Party and the Heimwehr into the 
Fatherland Front, dismissed Parliament and the Supreme Court, and assumed 
dictatorial powers (Binder, 2002). The Vatican ordered Austrian priests to support 
the coup, though thousands died as the Fatherland Front consolidated power.45
After Dollfuss’s 1934 assassination by Nazis, the Jesuit-trained Kurt Schuschnigg 
took over. From 1933 to the 1938 Austria was overtly clericofascist, with 
Catholicism legally mandatory and ultraconservative zealots, who wielded 
dictatorial secular powers, completing Vogelsang’s corporatist utopia.  
The project was an economic and political failure, and died abruptly in 
1938, with Hitler’s Anschluss of Austria into the Third Reich. However, Austrian 
corporatism is especially interesting in that it closely followed Papal teachings, 
received enthusiastic Vatican support, and also had a degree of democratic 
legitimacy at its outset.  
Falangist Spain 
Europe’s fourth great corporatist experiment was Spain, under Generalissimo 
Francisco Franco (Lukauskas 1997; Wiarda and MacLeish 2001; Witney 1965). 
An anticlerical socialist Republic displaced the monarchy in 1931, horrifying the 
deeply conservative and militantly Catholic countryside, which remained loyal to 
the Church, as did the military and aristocracy. Reactionary Catholics formed 
Falange units across Spain in 1932 to fight socialism and liberalism.46 The 
Falange quickly absorbed the nascent Fascist movement and the entire Catholic 
Youth Organization, run by Franco’s brother-in-law (Manhattan, 1950).  
Falangistas soon routinely beat and killed political opponents, including 
judges and journalists, in imitation of Italian black shirts. Street violence escalated 
into civil war by 1936, when Franco, with German and Italian backing, and 
blessings from every pulpit in Spain, staged a coup d’état. Fearing a Bolshevik 
                                                
44Manhatten (1947), pp. 244 and 245.  
45 Manhattan (1947), p. 257. 
46 The term Falange or Phalange derives from the ancient Greek phalanx battle formation.  
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state in Western Europe, the world’s democracies also tacitly backed the bloody 
overthrow of Spain’s elected government.  
Falangist economic policy, called National Syndicalism, faithfully 
replicated Italian corporatism. Corporations representing employers and 
employees took charge of each industry, with central economic control vested in 
military and Party appointees. Franco successfully broadened his support by 
ridding Spain of “excessive competition” with a vast system of subsidies and 
extensive regulation directed by Falangist officials who, working in parallel with 
the Syndicates, protected employed workers and existing business owners from 
market forces (Acena and Comin 1995; Wiarda and Mott 2001; Zaratiegui 2004).  
Spanish corporatism differed from Italian corporatism, and especially 
German corporatism, in its overt and passionate Catholicism. Unlike Austrian 
clericofascism, however, the Spanish Falange was ultimately controlled by the 
military, not the Church (Guerin, 1936). Also unlike its German and Italian 
counterparts, Spanish fascist corporatism was allowed to play out over many 
decades. The economic stagnation it wrought soon became clear, as Spain slipped 
ever farther behind other Western countries. Even before Franco’s death in 1975, 
the system was partially abandoned, and Spain’s accession to the European 
Economic Community left only tattered remnants of Franco’s system (Thomas 
2009).  
Vichy France 
Another corporatist experiment, often neglected by historians, is Fascist France 
under Marshall Henri Philippe Pétain, a devout Catholic and hero of the Great 
War. After the Fall of France in July 1940, Hitler appointed Pétain dictator of 
France. With his capital at Vichy (Paris and northern France remained under 
direct German occupation), Pétain reorganized the economy with Quadragesimo 
Anno as his explicit guide (Guérin 1936).47  
Pius welcomed the new regime with a letter to French Bishops 
proclaiming “a chance to bring about reawakening of the entire nation,” and 
personally assured the Vichy ambassador to the Holy See of his support for 
Pétain’s “work of moral recovery” (Manhattan, 1950).  
As in other corporatist economies, Syndicates and Associations of 
business owners and employees, modeled on medieval guilds, controlled prices, 
capacity, and entry throughout each vertically organized chain of industries. In 
Quadragesimo Anno, Pius envisions wages determined by need, rather than 
market forces, and Pétain complied with decrees ordering wages proportional to 
                                                
47 See also Halls (1995), esp. chapter 15.  
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the size of each worker’s family. Attendance at mass was compulsory, and all 
schools were turned over to the Catholic Church.  
Remarkably, Vichy France evoked voluble support from intellectuals. 
While some prominent academics fled, DiLorenzo (1994) writes that many others 
who stayed “began the most vigorous exploration of social and spiritual problems 
and initiated a full-blooded Catholic revival.” A few cases suffice to make the 
point.  
One such explorer, Charles Maurras, called Pétain’s ascension “a divine 
surprise.”48 Maurass founded intégrisme, an Anti-Cartesian philosophy portraying 
society as an organic whole composed of cooperating naturally unequal classes, 
united by blood and soil. A better fit with corporatism is hard to imagine. The 
Vatican initially welcomed Maurras – Pius XI called him “one of the finest minds 
alive today.”49 Mauras, in turn, admired the Church for, among other things, 
suppressing Gospels "by four obscure Jews" (Le Chemin du Paradis, 1894). Such 
pronouncements ultimately brought his Action Français newspaper mention in the 
Index of Forbidden Books.  
Other distinguished French Anti-Cartesians also lauded corporatism, if not 
fascism. The most notable, Émile Durkheim (1893), a founder of modern 
sociology, hedged his liberalism by advocating occupational cartels to instill 
moral discipline that the Church, aristocracy, and guilds no longer dispensed. 
Nisbet (1943, 1952, 1965) attributes this undeniably corporatist vision to unease 
with liberalism, but Giddens (1971) sees a renewed liberal republicanism. 
Unsurprisingly, others detect Marxist precognitions (e.g. Gouldner 1962; Lukes 
1973). Durkheim (1902) is remarkably explicit about industry cartels as ‘the 
elementary divisions of the State … [which] instead of remaining what it is today, 
an aggregate of juxtaposed territorial districts, would become a vast system of 
national corporations.”50 However, his corporatism is now generally regarded as 
an elitist vision of socialism, with scant connection to fascist corporatism 
(Newman, 1981). Ordinary people, Durkheim argues, cannot control their 
appetites and suffer a "malady of infinite aspiration” and overconsumption made 
possible by the division of labor and advances in science51. But Durkheim’s 
occupational Corporations and his State can, if run by a morally educated elite, 
reduce people’s appetites, and so heal this malady (Kaufman-Osborn, 1986).  
These, and numerous other examples, reveal a theoretical grandeur 
unparalleled in corporatism elsewhere. Sternhell (1978, 1983, 2009) argues that 
this reflects a depth of anti-Cartesianism in 19th century French thought that 
preconceived virtually every major element of Fascism, including corporatism, 
                                                
48The quote is from an editorial article in Maurras’ newspaper, Action Française, on April 1941.  
49Rhodes (1973), p. 106. 
50 Translation quoted in Newman (1981) pp. 7 – 8.  
51 Durkheim (1925), p. 40. 
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long before Mussolini’s March on Rome or Leo’s Rerum Novarum (Payne 1995). 
Sternhell details the influence of Anti-Cartesian French academics on each 
specific Fascist leader.  
At the most extreme was Alexis Carrel, Nobel Laureate in Medicine in 
1912 and famous for his account of a miracle at Lourdes.52 His 1935 bestseller 
L'Homme, cet inconnu (Man, This Unknown), argued for rule by an intellectual 
elite – an idea quite in keeping with corporatism – but went on to suggest gas 
chambers to cull "inferior stock." The introduction to the 1936 German edition of 
his book clarified that criminals and the insane could be “humanely and 
economically disposed of in small euthanasic institutions supplied with proper 
gasses.” Three years later, the Nazis built their first experimental gas chambers. 
While such outrages surely did not reflect Catholic teachings, corporatism’s 
legitimization of inequality perhaps explains an insufficiency of immediate 
outrage against such ideas, and perhaps even the low priority some ex-corporatist 
countries still seemingly assign to universal education, rural infrastructure, and 
social mobility. 
While corporatist government came late to France, it was arguably coming 
home. Although De Gaulle restored the separation of church and state after the 
war, corporatist ideals survived. Industry Associations continued negotiating 
wages and prices; a web of subsidies orchestrated capital investment; and an elite 
of Grandes Écoles alumni directed postwar reconstruction.  
Corporatism fit nowhere as snugly as in France, but ultimately yielded to 
French political ambitions to lead a united Europe. European Union policy 
continues to reflect an ongoing tension between Anglo-Saxon liberalism and 
French corporatist ideals.  
  
Academia 
Corporatism appealed to dictators because, in Mussolini’s words, it places “the 
labor force, as an obedient mass, at the disposal of the leader.”53 That may have 
been enough for Mussolini, and for others attracted to the doctrine from above. 
But corporatism was also unquestionably genuinely popular among unemployed 
workers and devout Catholic peasants. However, its most remarkable proponents 
included a roll call of distinguished interwar era academics.   
The eminent Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises served as a senior 
advisor to the clericofascist Dollfuss. Kuehnelt-Leddihn (2001) proposes that von 
Mises worked with Dollfuss to fight the greater evil of socialism, but also notes 
that he needed “steady employment.” However, Von Mises’ (1927 p. 51) own 
                                                
53 Nolte (1966).  
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words belie this: “It cannot be denied that [Italian] Fascism and similar 
movements … saved European civilization. The merit that Fascism has thereby 
won for itself will live on eternally in history.” 
Leading intellectuals and politicians everywhere effused praise they would 
later regret.54 In 1926, the House Foreign Relations chair, Congressman Sol 
Bloom (D-N.Y.), extolled Mussolini as “a great thing not only for Italy but for all 
of us if he succeeds. It is his inspiration, his determination, his constant toil that 
has literally rejuvenated Italy . . .” In 1927, Sir Winston Churchill wrote “If I had 
been an Italian I am sure I would have been entirely with you [and] don the 
Fascist black shirt.” The same year, George Bernard Shaw declared that 
"socialists should be delighted to find at last a socialist [Mussolini] who speaks 
and thinks as responsible rulers do.” Shaw helped found the British Union of 
Fascists, which produced an Outline of the Corporate State that the organization's 
founder, Sir Oswald Mosley, described as “the Italian Model.” The American poet 
Ezra Pound saw Mussolini “continuing the task of Thomas Jefferson.” If all this 
seems surreal, see Lilla (2003) for lists of prominent Western intellectuals lauding 
communist dictators.  
The Axis Powers’ defeat in 1945 ended intellectuals’ fascination with 
fascism, but its economics lived on. Catholic schools and universities throughout 
the world continued to stress corporatism, and French intellectuals taught a 
generation or more of the innate inequality of human beings and the elite’s duties 
to the masses, of the social necessity of industrial Corporations, of the evils of 
market forces, and of the principle of subsidiarity.  
Unto the Ends of the Earth 
Corporatist ideologies took root across Europe. In 1932, António de Oliveira 
Salazar’s Estado Novo seized power in Portugal. Suppressing pro-Italian activists 
in his National Syndicalist Movement, the Catholic seminary student Salazar 
established an ardently Catholic corporatist order (Wiarda 1976, 1977). Until 
1974, an elite of Church-educated academic corporatists set just prices, wages, 
and quotas, rarely relinquishing such power to the rather ill-organized 
Corporations (Williamson 1985 p. 108).55 Poland’s interwar Pilsudski dictatorship 
likewise adopted a corporatist ideology, as did Greece under Metaxas; and later 
Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuanian, and Romania; as well as 
puppet governments in Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Holland and other German 
protectorates. In many, including Belgium and Croatia, local Catholic 
                                                
54 The following quotes are all taken from DiLorenzo (1994), who discusses this fascination with 
Fascism at length.  
55 Limited accession to EFTA in 1960 eroded the regime’s autarky and thus constrained its price 
fixing power thereafter.  
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reactionaries enthusiastically helped the invaders overthrow the institutions of 
liberal capitalism and erect corporatist economies.  
From Europe, zeal for corporatism spread to the Americas. A 1933 
document entitled Program on Social Reconstruction, released by the Canadian 
Roman Catholic Bishops, proclaims “It is the duty of the State to impose overall 
direction on the national economy and to establish a National Economic Council 
which will express a corporatist organization and make it possible for the 
authorities to act in close collaboration with the authorized representatives of all 
branches of production.”56 Even in the midst of total war, a Collective Pastoral 
Letter dated March 11, 1941 “explicitly recommends the institution of 
corporatism. … This would indeed be the New Order, based on justice and 
charity, which all good citizens demand.”  
Roman Catholic schools and universities everywhere trained future leaders 
to appreciate corporatist insights. The force of these teachings is apparent in 
Nemni and Nemni (2006), whose document the early life of Canadian Prime 
Minister Pierre Eliot Trudeau. The biography chronicles Trudeau’s Jesuit high 
school teachers assigning one French corporatist text after another, denouncing 
liberalism and socialism as theologically evil, and proclaiming corporatism the 
only ideology consistent with Christ. These teachings perhaps influenced 
Trudeau’s worldview, though he also flirted with other extreme ideologies before 
settling into the center-left of his country’s politics (Nemni and Nemni 2006). 
Catholic corporatist teachings took deepest root in Latin America (Wiarda 
1981, 2004, Edwards 2010). Although overt Fascist movements spread across the 
region in the 1930s, most died out by the 1960s. But corporatist economics 
proved irresistible to Cold War era dictators who seized power to save their 
countries from erring voters. Thus, although Bolivia’s Falange Socialista 
Boliviana, established in 1937, never won an election, its leaders featured 
prominently in the cabinet of General Hugo Banzer, who seized power in 1971. 
The Falange quickly dissolved, as its membership migrated to Banzer’s 
Nationalist Democratic Action party.57 Cold War Latin American dictatorships, 
with the exception of Castro’s Cuba, evoked Iberian corporatist prescriptions and 
accepted the tutelage of Catholic clerics (Morse 1964; Veliz 1979; Wiarda 1968, 
1969, 1974, 1981, 2004): Juan Peron’s Argentina, Getúlio Vargas’ Brazil, Carlos 
Ibáñez del Campo’s Chile, Laureano Gómez’s Colombia, Rafael Trujillo’s 
Dominican Republic, Jorge Ubico’s Guatemala, the PRI’s Mexico, the Somozas’ 
Nicaragua, Alfredo Stroessner’s Paraguay, Manuel Odría’s Peru, and across 
Central America. The lasting vigor of these treatments persists in Latin American 
industry’s chronic dependence on subsidies, aversion to competition, protectionist 
                                                
56 Nemni and Nemni (2006).  
57 For details, see Bertrand (1973).  
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leanings, and profoundly concentrated corporate control (Haber 1997, 2000; 
Haber et al. 2008; Wiarda 1999, 2004).  
Institutions across the region are still constrained by Corporatist legacies 
and the vested interest they sustain (Edwards 2010). A key debate (see Collier, 
1995) in Latin American Studies is whether corporatism is a cherished cultural 
heritage or a dispensable ideological import (Schmitter 1971, 1974). Thus, radical
dependency theorists – most notably Prebisch (1950) – assume corporatism as a 
common background, and argue that free trade lets cartels of multinationals use 
monopsony power in raw-material producing developing countries and monopoly 
power in finished-goods producing developed countries to lock in an unequal 
international economic order.58 Prebisch’s solution, import substitution, has 
developing country governments erecting trade barriers and banishing 
multinationals to regain sovereignty over their corporatist economies.59  
The debate between corporatism-as-problem and corporatism-as-solution 
framed the world for a generation or more of Latin American economists (Adams 
2004; Vellinga 2004, Wiarda 2004). Within the field of Latin American studies, 
the argument that a Corporatist legacy constrains development remains prominent 
(Wiarda 2004; Edwards 2010).  
Import substitution (Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950) spread from Latin 
America to post-colonial Africa, endorsed by Wallerstein’s (1979, 1983, 1984, 
1986) models of core countries exploiting various categories of periphery 
countries. These models essentially organized the then emerging field of African 
Studies. Thus blessed by economic theory, corporatist thinking spread across the 
Third World.  
The Young Turks, who seized power after Ottoman Turkey’s defeat in the 
Great War, like Mussolini, needed a modern ideology other than liberalism, which 
seemed too tied to the Christian West, and socialism, whose atheism offended 
religious Muslims. Parla and Davison (2004) describe how Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, the movement’s leader, seized upon corporatism as an economic model 
for his secular republic. Kemalism, as the ideology became known in Turkey, 
borrowed heavily from Mussolini and Durkheim’s (1893, 1897, 1902) secular 
corporatism, rather than Rerum Novarum.  
As the Second World War drew to a close, Arab nationalist movements 
gained strength in the British and French protectorates and colonies of North 
Africa and the Middle East. The Arab proverb “the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend” engendered a wartime interest in the Axis powers, and Arab independence 
movement leaders saw in secular corporatism a doctrine unassociated with liberal 
colonizers and untainted by atheism. Thus, the Christian Phalange Party in 
                                                
58 See also Singer (1950). This thesis is generally referred to now as the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis.  
59A rival solution, of course, was Marxist revolution.  
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Lebanon modeled itself explicitly on Franco’s Falangistas; and the Ba’ath 
Socialist movement, founded by the Syrian Christian and Sorbonne graduate, 
Michel Aflaq, borrowed heavily from French corporatist thinking.60 Farah (1978), 
laying out Ba’athist ideology, attributes many of its key premises to the same 
litany of French Anti-Cartesian philosophers whom Sternhell (1983) credits for 
corporatism. Gelvin (2002, esp. 88-96) describes Egyptian dictator Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s explicit imposition of corporatist economics after the 1958 Suez Crisis 
and lays out the role of corporatist thought in Ba’ath policies.  
Corporatism`s Catholic roots necessitated careful marketing in the Arab 
World. Jaber (1966), never mentioning corporatism, explains Ba’athism in terms 
paralleling Quadragesimo Anno: Ba’athism avoids socialism’s “materialist 
internationalistic message and denial of nationalism and spiritual values” that 
“treats disease with disease” (p. 105). Thus, in Ba’ath Socialism, there is no “class 
struggle” (p. 106) for “socialism is secondary to nationalism, it is a means for 
resurrecting the Arab nation to glory” (p. 101). Equally Ba’athism rejects 
liberalism because “Arabs … cannot accept an alien doctrine” (p. 105); rather “all 
individual freedoms are defined ‘within the national interest’” (p. 125) and 
“liberties must be sacrificed during a period of inqilab (transformation) until the 
Arab ‘self’ is strengthened” (p. 126).  
Thus, the constitution of the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party declares that 
“private property is protected, but the law shall regulate its social function” (§26). 
Labor has no right to strike, but is entitled to dignified treatment by employers; 
and all workers should belong to state-controlled unions (§18). The constitution 
holds that “the government will direct the affairs of domestic and foreign 
commerce to abolish monopolies and protect domestic enterprises” (§36). 
Although pre-existing monopolies are abolished, competition in each industry is 
to be controlled via “a comprehensive economic plan [that] will be drawn up to 
increase national production” (§37).  
 During the inqilab (revolution), from which no Ba’athist regime ever 
emerged, an ethically enlightened elite would lead the masses. Obedience to this 
elite would stem from a mass commitment to an “eternal Arab mission” to 
transform the world, in part with Islam.61 This is epitomized in the Ba’ath Party 
                                                
60 The Arabic word ba’ath roughly translates as renaissance or resurgence.  
61 Aflaq, though Christian, realized that any successful ideology would have to appeal to the 
intense pride Muslims feel in the superiority of their religion (Jaber, 1966). Aflaq (1943) writes 
“The connection of Islam to Arabism is not, therefore, similar to that of any religion to any 
nationalism. The Arab Christians, when their nationalism is fully awakened and when they restore 
their genuine character, will recognize that Islam for them is nationalist education in which they 
have to be absorbed in order to understand and love it to the extent that they become concerned 
about Islam as about the most precious thing in their Arabism. If the actual reality is still far from 
this wish, the new generation of Arab Christians has a task which it should perform with daring 
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slogan “One Arab Nation with an Eternal Mission” (Jaber, p 115). As Jaber (p. 
118) notes, most Ba’athist leaders were educated in Europe, and quite 
unconnected to traditions of their societies. They legitimized their leadership by 
portraying themselves as an elite vanguard.  
Avowedly Ba’athist parties took power in Syria and Iraq; and Ba’athist
ideology profoundly influenced secular Arab nationalist leaders across North 
Africa and the Middle East. Ayubi (1995) describes the spread of this ideology 
across the Arab world, and its ultimate failure to displace traditional tribal and 
religious associations. A debate in Arab studies, in some sense paralleling that in 
Latin American studies, turns on whether corporatist economies are a cultural 
heritage or an imported paternalism (Sharabi, 1992; Cosgel 2007; Gobe 2008).  
In Asia, the military government of Japan copied many German policies in 
the 1930s and early 1940s, including increasingly intrusive state control over all 
major corporations. Post-war Japanese economic policies contained significant 
corporatist elements, such as extensive state subvention of selected firms and 
paternalistic labor relations (Raines and Leathers 1992). Military dictators of 
South Korea, Taiwan, and other Asian countries adopted parts of the corporatist 
model for a time, but soon modified it beyond recognition. Some pro-
independence intellectuals in British India also envisioned a corporatist system – 
an economy liberated from market forces, ordered by caste consciousness, and 
united by Hindu religious nationalism (Basu 2001, esp. c. 1 & 4). Independence 
movement leaders throughout Africa, leery of liberalism but equally unwilling to 
subscribe to full-fledged socialism, likewise appreciated the virtues of 
corporatism (Nyang'oro and Shaw 1989) and accepted its strictures to varying 
degrees.  
Classical corporatist economics remains a prestigious intellectual position 
in French schools and universities, with free market economics either 
marginalized (Theil 2007) or taught as an “autistic” mathematical abstraction 
(Fullbrook 2003). Countries whose francophone elites otherwise benefit from an 
education in France receive a flattering presentation of these ideas. Interwar 
education policies differed starkly in different colonial empires: Oliver and Fage 
(1990, c. 18) write that British African colonial governments funded missionary 
schools “capable of providing perhaps a quarter of their young citizens with two 
to four years of schooling and a select few with eight years or even twelve”, but 
that “the French, on the other hand, … set up state schools in which a very small 
minority of Africans followed the curricula of metropolitan France.” That 
curriculum presented corporatism as the pinnacle of social ideologies and taught 
of the elite’s duty to guide the masses. These ideals, and those of Vichy, feature 
prominently in the education of French Africa’s postwar elites, and persist in their 
                                                                                                                                    
and detachment, sacrificing for it their pride and benefits, for there is nothing that equals Arabism 
and the honor of belonging to it."  
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independent countries’ curricula (Cooper and Barbier-Wiesser 2004). That French 
West Africa went for Vichy, while French Equatorial Africa backed de Gaul is far 
less important than the elitist ideologies the French-educated leaders of all former 
French colonies learned from their metropolitan French schoolmasters and 
professors. Niger’s reliance on economic ideas associated with interwar 
corporatism (Robinson 1991) epitomizes former French colonies across the 
continent. Vietnam, another former French colony, illustrates the remarkable 
tenacity of French secular corporatism, which features prominently in its post-
socialist economic reforms (Jeong 1997).  
Corporatism, tainted by its wartime association with Fascism, became an 
unappealing label for the economic policies of progressive Third World nations. 
Consequently, corporatist economic systems are so-advertised mainly in devoutly 
Catholic regions and former French colonies, whose elites were taught by French 
academics to venerate the term. Elsewhere, corporatism little different from that 
of Fascist Italy or Falangist Spain took deep root, but under local aliases such as 
Arab Socialism, Libyan Jamahiriya Economics, and so on (Wiarda 1997).  
 Full-blooded corporatism failed to take root in the United States (Gordon 
1998), Britain and its other former colonies, and the Nordic countries, though 
policies characterized as neocorporatist arose in all of them. Roosevelt’s first New 
Deal, ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, was America’s only serious 
attempt to follow an overtly corporatist path (Whitman 1997; Black 2003). To 
combat deflation, Britain’s postwar Labour governments built socialism with tax 
incentives encouraging employee-run pension funds to buy corporate stocks 
(Cheffins 2009). Canada’s depression era government established industry 
Marketing Boards to fix prices, but dismantled them rapidly after World War II – 
with a few exceptions such as agricultural product marketing boards, which 
persisted for several decades. Corporatism was far more popular and long-lived 
among French than English Canadian intellectuals and politicians (Nemni and 
Nemni (2006). Australia and New Zealand also established marketing boards and 
centralized wage bargaining to various extents, but abandoned these in subsequent 
liberal reforms. The Scandinavian countries all built social democratic welfare 
states prone to intrusive tinkering with markets, but retained market prices. 
Consumer demand for imports kept all the Nordic economies open to global trade, 
and long democratic traditions made comprehensive price fixing by 
unaccountable elites untenable. But the deeper reasons for institutions developing 
along these paths, and thus for full blooded corporatism’s failure to flourish in 
these countries, are unclear.62  
Despite these occasional lapses, corporatism’s immense influence around 
the world and across the decades renders Pius XI unduly reticent in praising 
                                                
62 On this issue, see Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), Morck and Stier (2005), Stulz (2005), La Porta et 
al. (2008) and many others.  
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Rerum Novarum thus: “Catholic principles on the social question have as a result, 
passed little by little into the patrimony of all human society, and We rejoice that 
the eternal truths which Our Predecessor of glorious memory proclaimed so 
impressively have been frequently invoked and defended not only in non-Catholic 
books and journals but also in legislative halls and courts of justice.”  
7.  The French Connection 
Recent work in financial economics finds a remarkable correlation of poor 
economic outcomes - slow economic growth, inefficient capital allocation, 
financial system lethargy, weak economies of scale, etc. – with a “hierarchical 
religion” such as Roman Catholicism or Islam (La Porta et al. 1997; Stulz and 
Williamson 2003) and with a French legal system heritage (La Porta et al. 2008). 
These findings are notable for both their empirical prominence and lack of ready 
intuition.  
Pagano and Volpin (2005) convincingly demonstrate the empirical 
importance of religion, but justify it with a model of labor and investor voting 
strategies, rather than with corporatist legacies. La Porta et al. (2008) survey the 
voluminous literature on the economic problems associated with a legal system 
based on the French Civil Code. Much of that literature attacks their earlier work 
for incompletely appreciating or overstating the importance of different legal 
systems. However, a French legal origin – or something highly correlated with it 
– is unambiguously highly significantly predictive of poor economic outcomes.  
Other factors – some far less empirically robust – clearly ought to affect 
economic performance: education (Glaeser et al. 2004), colonial conditions 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001), state intervention and legal formalism (Djankov et al., 
2003), risk tolerance (Li et al. 2010), trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006, 
2008, 2009), trade and investment barriers (Stulz 2005), labor law (Pagano and 
Volpin, 2005; Roe, 2003), democracy (Perotti and von Thadden, 2006; Pagano 
and Volpin, 2005; Bordo and Rouseau, 2006; Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2006), 
price stability (Perotti and Schweinbacher, 2009), and entrenched elites (Rajan 
and Zingales, 2003, Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 2000; Acemoglu, 2005; 
Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005; Perotti and Volpin, 2005).  
The oddly robust empirical correlations of economic infirmity with 
“hierarchical religions” and French legal systems require explanation. Stulz and 
Williamson (2003) recall Weber (1905) in listing various Catholic doctrines with 
illiberal and anti-business implications. However, Novak (1993) rightly notes that 
many Protestant churches’ teachings were little different. La Porta et al (1997) 
argue that hierarchical religions – Roman Catholicism and Islam are their two 
major examples – promote vertical relationships of authority and submission, but 
impede lateral relationships of trust. Weber (1905) complements this: 
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Protestantism, he declares, arose from a merchant’s rationalistic mindset of 
balancing plusses and minuses that “disenchanted” the world and prepared minds 
for science. The stirrings of liberalism are thus a cause, not an effect, all of which 
Weber celebrates and Anti-Cartesian philosophers, such as his colleague Sombart 
(1906, 1911, 1928), abhor. Nonetheless, elemental features of the Roman Catholic 
faith are unlikely suspects, for Rajan and Zingales (2003) show the early 20th
century’s most financially developed countries to be predominantly Catholic.  
This suggests that the explanation should be a feature of the Catholic faith 
that attained prominence only as the 20th century unfolded. That feature, ideally, 
might also explain why a French legal code also correlates with poor economic 
outcomes (La Porta et al. 1997). We suggest that institutional residues of 
Quadragesimo Anno and Rerum Novarum and of secular French corporatist 
teachings may well be this missing factor.  
Corporatism entered Catholic dogma at the end of the 19th century, and 
took hold across Catholic countries in the interwar period and Cold War era. This 
dovetails precisely with Rajan and Zingales’s (2003) finding of Great Reversals in 
the financial development of both Catholic countries and countries with legal 
systems of French derivation in that period. The Jesuits and other clergy running 
the schools and universities that educated elites across the Roman Catholic world 
needed, perhaps, a generation to put Rerum Novarum into effect.  
The remarkable enthusiasm of some French academics for corporatism 
may also underlie the oddly persistent correlation of a French legal system with 
weak economic outcomes. The elites of developing countries tend to speak the 
languages of their former colonial powers, and often receive advanced education 
in their best universities. The great majority of non-Catholic developing 
economies with French Civil Code legal systems are former French colonies, 
whose Francophone and French educated political elites were students in the 
1930s and 1940s. Their French language educations would have included the 
thoughts of the great 19th century Anti-Cartesian philosophers discussed above. 
Such educations would have delegitimized liberal economics and pushed 
corporatist ideals at a generation or more of Francophone third world leaders. 
Meanwhile, France and other European nations substantially diluted their 
corporatist heritage in an increasingly open and liberal European Union.  
In hindsight, a legacy of fundamentalist corporatism seems a plausible 
common factor underlying other drags on economic performance that, at first 
glance, seem unrelated. Corporatism sanctifies established hierarchies, endorsing 
the perpetual power of entrenched elites. This also obviously makes high quality 
education for the poor unnecessary. Corporatism, at least as much as socialism, 
necessitates extensive state intervention. Corporatism’s principle of subsidiarity 
requires extensive legal formalism to define freedom of action at each level of the 
hierarchy. Corporatism sanctifies the status quo – existing jobs must pay 
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traditional wages and existing firms must continue providing these jobs – so a low 
tolerance for risk emerges naturally, as do rigid labor laws and lofty entry 
barriers. By consecrating hierarchy, including the patriarchal family, and vilifying 
impersonal market transactions, corporatism deters both trust in strangers and 
trustworthy behavior towards strangers (Bolton et al. 2008). Similarly, 
corporatism legitimizes barriers against foreign trade and investment, for without 
these corporatist Associations could not meaningfully set prices, wages, and 
production (Murphy et al. 1992). Finally, as Mussolini (1935, 1936) makes clear, 
corporatism can do without democracy.63 A corporatist legacy is surely not solely 
responsible for all the institutional weaknesses of laggard economies, but it quite 
likely helped prolong these infirmities, and thus their human consequences.   
Obviously, inept central bankers, insane leaders, adverse trade shocks, and 
sheer bad luck also clearly matter. So, doubtless, do numerous as yet 
unappreciated factors. But a legacy from an era of fundamentalist corporatism 
may well be a previously unacknowledged missing link, coalescing many 
recognized effects into one. For example, European invaders carved up the 
Americas long before Rerum Novarum, yet which colonial power seized which 
American territory still matters (Acemoglu et al. 2001).  Perhaps, though, this 
matters in part at least because corporatist philosophies defused from only some 
mother countries to their former colonies.  
We therefore suggest that work explaining present day financial 
development might consider a country’s corporatist legacy. We further suggest 
that the best proxy for a corporatist legacy is an indicator variable set to one for 
countries with Roman Catholic (or Muslim) majorities, or a French-educated elite.  
Across non-Catholic countries, we suggest that a Francophone elite can be 
identified using an indicator variable for a French Civil Code legal system. We 
suggest that this, rather than attempts to measure corporatism in terms of the 
details of labor regulations or labor input to decision making, might best capture 
the spirit of corporatism, the defunct theology which we believe yet enslaves the 
practical men who command the economic resources of many countries, 
regardless of how exempt they might feel themselves from any intellectual 
influence.  
8.  Economics, Ethics, and Hindsight 
We suspect that Catholic social teachings unintentionally perpetuated widespread 
poverty in scores of countries – including many beyond Catholic unity and even 
                                                
63 Pareto (1906, 1922), Schumpeter (1942, 1951), and others saw excessive democracy leading, 
perhaps inevitably, to socialist stagnation because of the instability associated with the high 
growth rates of liberal capitalism. This accords with empirical findings linking robust, but 
constitutionally limited, democracy with high economic growth (Haber and Perotti 2008). 
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outside Christendom. Although their attendant effects on souls lie beyond the 
scope of this study, the empirical evidence above is consistent with the overall 
impact of these teachings being profoundly detrimental.  
Of course, corporatist teachings were never implemented perfectly. In 
many countries, explicitly corporatist leaders held power only briefly, though the 
institutions they established often lived on. And many corporatist leaders 
implemented the model only partially. However, in every case corporatist 
ideology came with a profound moral conviction of unique rectitude. Such 
emotionally highly charged social norms can entrench a profound “status quo” or 
“just world” bias (Lerner 1980; Kay and Jost 2003; Jost et al. 2004), consistent 
with the ideology’s remarkable tenacity (Wiarda 2004).  
By lending ecclesiastic and academic authority to corporatism, clerics and 
secular scholars lent legitimacy to oppressive hierarchies, entrenched elites, and 
rigged markets. That legitimacy locked in a status quo of poverty and a set of 
economic policies that could hardly have perpetuated poverty more effectively 
had they been designed to that end. It condemns the intense competition that 
economic theory posits as the driving force behind economic efficiency; and 
demands instead state-enforced cartels to shelter businesses and workers from 
uncertainty.  
Corporatism preserves existing jobs, businesses, and industries; protecting 
all from innovation and instability. Thus, workers need not invest in the human 
capital accumulation that liberal economies demand for continued high 
employment, and that econometric evidence indicates is a first order factor in 
economic growth (Glaeser et al. 2004).  
Likewise, cartelized corporatist industries free firms from competition to 
innovate. Schumpeter (1942) posits that established cartelized firms might be 
innovators, contradicting his earlier hypothesis (Schumpeter 1912) that creative 
upstart firms are an economy’s primary innovators. Empirical work linking 
productivity to corporate turnover (Fogel et al. 2008) and easy entry (Djankov et 
al. 2000) supports the young upstart as the better innovator. Thus, Corporatism’s 
organization of the economy through cooperation between established businesses, 
organized labor, and the state excludes the innovative entrants that appear most 
important in fueling economic growth. 
 It is profoundly unfortunate that Pius’s concern about socialism in §95, 
“some who fear that the State, instead of confining itself as it ought to the 
furnishing of necessary and adequate assistance, is substituting itself for free 
activity; that the new syndical and corporative order … serve(s) particular 
political ends than leads to the reconstruction and promotion of a better social 
order” was not perceived to apply equally to any system that entrusts a select elite 
with uncontestable power – including corporatism as laid out elsewhere in the 
encyclical.  
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We believe that the Church’s error was to stray from its own teachings on 
the inevitability of sin. Adam Smith (1759) and the economic theory he founded 
agree with Catholic doctrine that human beings are ethically challenged. In a 
widely known quote, condemned by Ratzinger (2010), among others, Smith 
(1776) argues rightly that “it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, baker, 
and brewer that we get our dinner, but from their self interest.” But Smith (1762) 
explains that our regard for others directs our self interest towards producing 
things that others value. This intuitive human appreciation of each other’s needs, 
which Smith (1762) calls fellow feeling, justifies Smith’s (1776) advocacy of free 
markets.64 Trade requires putting oneself in the other party’s position, and thus 
aligns one’s self regard with the needs of strangers. Such grace, at least, genuinely 
arises amid merchants and money changers.  
Leo was, in hindsight, astonishingly overconfident in asserting that “the 
Church possesses a power [to] bring men to act from a motive of duty, to control 
their passions and appetites, to love God and their fellow men.”65 Power corrupts 
even devout Catholics. Elites less fearful of dislodgement via hostile takeovers, 
foreign competition, and the unhindered economic mobility of talented upstarts 
have a more absolute power, and therefore risk a more absolute corruption. 
Corporatism’s cartels bleach private property of its social purpose – the effecting 
of that very dislodgment and price changes and market forces reallocate the 
economy’s resources to where they are most valuable. Without conveying the 
freedom to change jobs, retool factories, and create new markets, private property 
is no more than the dead hand of entrenched privilege. Corporatism’s defense of 
private property, but without these features, is indefensible on both efficiency and 
equality grounds.  
Corporatism’s principle of subsidiarity likewise throws away the baby 
while diligently guarding the dirty bathwater. Letting each level in the hierarchy 
decide what powers to delegate to that below it and equating submission to this 
hierarchy with godliness explicitly let elites retain such powers as are most 
advantageous to them. Unsurprisingly, Latin American political and economic 
elites jealously guard their powers to limit competition, but generously delegate 
the enforcement of nonsmoking zones to shop stewards.  
9. Benediction  
Government’s calling is to supervise the economy. It must design and operate a 
system that mediates the control and redistribution of resources. Control over an 
economy’s resources translates unfailingly into power over others, so 
                                                
64 Smith (1762) was republished during his life after 1776, without major changes. Smith clearly 
did not change his mind; but regarded the two works as complementary.  
65 Rerum Novarum §26.  
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governments must acknowledge that they are charged with distributing, 
legitimizing, and limiting the power of some people over other people. This basic 
truth renders liberal free market economists who ignore distributional issues 
vulnerable to ethics-based critiques that many find convincing.  
For over a century and a half, since Marx and Engels published their 
Communist Manifesto in 1848, amid liberal rebellions across Europe, the most 
fundamentally divisive distributional issue has been the distribution of power 
between capitalists and workers. The Marxist critique of liberal economics holds 
that industrialization excessively concentrates command over the economy’s 
resources, and hence power over others, in the hands of capitalists. That is, 
capitalists’ power over workers’ jobs and wages lets the powerful take advantage 
of the powerless leaving workers the losers in this class struggle, despite their 
constituting the majority of the population. Marx and Engels call for workers of 
the world to discard false allegiances to nation and religion, and to unite in 
demand of an even distribution of resources as the only solution to class conflict. 
Somewhat ironically, this struggle is now reasserting itself as labor unrest (Lee 
and Shen, 2009) spreads across Communist China in the wake of market reforms 
with distinctly neocorporatist tinge – entrenched inequality in the hukou system of 
residency restrictions (Cheng and Selden 2009), and monopolistic Party-
controlled “private companies” (Pistor 2009; Mcgregor 2010).  
Now a trite litany, “Workers of the world, unite!” was a jarring 
provocation when Leo and Pius wrote their encyclicals. Reasonable people feared 
for their countries, property, and safety – especially after the 1917 Great October 
Revolution and seeming economic success of the Soviet Union, whose agitators in 
Catholic countries were avowedly anticlerical. The mid 19th century’s popes were 
waging a defensive war to protect feudal institutions – commanding serfs’ utter 
submission to their lords, damning technology, and condemning as diabolical 
elections, freedom of the press, public education, bible study groups, and the like 
(Manhattan 1947). Leo sought to reformulate the conflict by advancing 
corporatism as a new system that could preserve what was good about the old, 
embrace liberalism’s private property and socialism’s concern for the poor, and 
challenge both for the commanding heights of an industrial economy.  
Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno are therefore rightly considered 
major advances in Catholic social teachings, for what came before was much 
worse. The church successfully groomed corporatism into a seemingly viable 
third way. Diamant (1960) argues that the failure of the Austrian corporatist 
experiment, in which the clergy had unhindered powers, demonstrates the utter 
bankruptcy of Catholic social thought. This may be too extreme, for Mussolini’s 
Italy enjoyed some economic success. However, corporatism went badly wrong 
where it took and held power for the long term.  
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Corporatism erred by denying human nature. Like socialism, corporatism 
presumed the continual reliability of a benevolent and competent elite. But devout 
Catholics proved no less vulnerable to the temptations of power than Lenin’s 
socialist central planning engineers. Since corporatism left superiors to determine 
what powers subsidiarity would carry down to lower ranks, the principle was no 
protection against abuse of authority. Any authority worth abusing could be 
retained. Corporatist regimes in Iberia, Latin America, and elsewhere fostered 
corruption and cronyism. Mussolini was wrong about many things, but he rightly 
declared corporatism placing “the labor force, as an obedient mass, at the disposal 
of the leader” (Nolte 1966), and Catholic generals, dictators, and oligarchs pursue 
their self-interest as vigorously as anyone else.  
Corporatism also erred in misapprehending the internal workings of a 
liberal free market economy. Corporatist elites, by setting “fair” wages and prices, 
insulated consumers and producers from the price signals and thus the incentives 
that, by coordinating economic activity efficiently, justify the existence of private 
property in a liberal free market economy. These self-interest-driven processes – 
the collection of information and the direction of private effort – provide needed 
adjustments to any society in flux (Hayek 1944). Flux is hard for a society to 
avoid in the modern world.  
Religion has always influenced government – shamans instruct tribal 
chiefs in hunter-gatherer culture and the tradition persists. Naturally, the Roman 
Church did not excuse itself from this duty. Resolving the class struggle, ending 
human suffering, and allocating wealth fairly are all economic problems with 
profoundly moral overtones, which naturally evoke religious commentary. But 
religious authorities find economics uniquely troubling. Adam Smith’s (1776) 
insight that self-interest, properly channeled, could yield socially beneficent 
outcomes is deeply troubling to Christian ethicists who would assess sin on the 
basis of intentions, rather than outcomes. Economists’ endorsement of ethically 
damnable intentions, however grand the results, strikes many as “ends” justifying 
“means” – a moral adage even most neoclassical economists appreciate as of 
limited utility. That such arguments were especially unconvincing to clerics is 
perhaps understandable. This troublesome disconnect is why Knight (1939 p. 399) 
concludes that “evil rather than good seems likely to result from any appeal to 
Christian religious or moral teachings in connection with the problems of social 
action.”  
The Vatican represented corporatism as a middle way between socialism 
and liberalism. This is defensible only in that corporatism’s principle of 
subsidiarity gave central governments a lesser role than in socialism and a greater 
role than in liberalism. But this is only one of the doctrine’s four core ideals. 
Recognition of innate human inequality probably causes socialists and liberals 
equal discomfort, as does a “harmonious cooperation” of government, labor, and 
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private business. Wage, price, and quota fixing Corporations are objectionable to 
liberals as delegated central planning and to socialists as fortresses of oligarchic 
privilege.  
Corporatism’s metaphoric status as an ethical passageway between the 
twin evils of liberalism and socialism is thus primarily about the role of 
government. Socialism is indeed a polar case where the market is untrustworthy 
and cast aside before government planners; while liberalism similarly deems 
government untrustworthy and casts regulation aside before market forces. Of 
course, social democrats acknowledge a role for markets and liberals recognize 
the need for the state to protect private property, enforce contracts, and perhaps 
even regulate financial institutions.  
But the genuine middle way now seems to be the liberal democratic 
welfare state that, in various guises, prevails across the developed world. The 
poles are uninhabited – no one seriously advocates Dickensian liberalism or 
Soviet socialism. But corporatism is equally lifeless. Neo-corporatists might argue 
for stronger unions, or for labor input in corporate governance, but these are 
adjustments to the liberal democratic welfare state – arguably the worst economic 
system, except for all the others.  
Corporatism is not dead. Its shade haunts many countries. Corporatist 
policies from the 1930s live on in wage and price rigging to benefit incumbent 
firms and workers, and in firms expectations of subsidies, tax breaks, and 
regulatory forbearance from governments used to running national Associations. 
Oligarchies in Latin America and elsewhere drew long life from corporatist 
legitimacy. That liberal democracy might take root across Latin America remains 
an open question; that it might flourish across the Middle East and in former 
French colonies in Africa is not yet testable.  
We clearly have yet to attain a perfect economic system. Too much 
socialism risks government corruption and stagnation. Too much liberalism risks 
costly bubbles and busts and unacceptable poverty for too many. Corporatism 
presented itself as a middle way between the two. In fact, it resurrects medieval 
economic ideals, mixing legitimized inequality with fixed prices – arguably the 
least desirable features of liberalism and socialism, respectively. Despite stock 
market bubbles, special interest group politics, and other chronic infirmities, the 
liberal democratic welfare state, our ongoing experiment in blending the best of 
liberalism and socialism, remains the state of the art. Whether the next step is a 
better blend or something entirely new is at present unknowable. The Catholic 
Church has accepted this and moved on. We propose that corporatism’s last and 
best service to humanity would be to die finally, and to leave no trace that it ever 
was.  
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